Cartel enforcement in the EU: Leniency programmes and the appeals process

Kai Hüschelrath
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Kai Hueschelrath

No 3/2015, ZEW policy briefs from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: Fighting cartels is a major priority of EU competition policy. Acting in concert with national competition authorities in the EU, the European Commission (EC) has made considerable efforts to promote competitiveness by detecting and punishing cartels. These efforts are visible not only in the increasing number of cartel cases, but also in the substantial rise in the average fines imposed per cartel member. While the successes of past years in fighting cartels clearly hinge to some extent on various policy reforms, many commentators argue that the introduction of the EC leniency programme (LP) in 1996 is likely a key enabler. Generally, LPs offer violators a fine reduction or even full amnesty from fines if they disclose an infringement to the responsible authority and cooperate during the subsequent investigation. Below, the key results of an empirical ZEW study on the determinants of self-reporting under the European LP are presented. Given the substantial increase in both the number of detected cartels and the average fine per cartel member, it comes as no surprise that an increasing number of convicted firms have considered filing an appeal against EC decisions. Below, the characteristics of firms filing an appeal and the factors that determine their success in terms of fine reduction are discussed.

Date: 2015
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