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Cournot games with biconcave demand

Christian Ewerhart

No 16, ECON - Working Papers from Department of Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: Biconcavity is a simple condition on inverse demand that corresponds to the ordinary concept of concavity after simultaneous parameterized transformations of price and quantity. The notion is employed here in the framework of the homogeneous-good Cournot model with potentially heterogeneous firms. The analysis leads to unified conditions, respectively, for the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium via nonincreasing best-response selections, for existence via quasiconcavity, and for uniqueness of the equilibrium. The usefulness of the generalizations is illustrated in cases where inverse demand is either "nearly linear" or isoelastic. It is also shown that commonly made assumptions regarding large outputs are often redundant.

Keywords: Cournot games; existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium; generalized concavity; supermodularity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-04, Revised 2014-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-gth and nep-ind
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Cournot games with biconcave demand (2014) Downloads
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