Siesta: A theory of freelancing

Maria Saez-Marti

No 55, ECON - Working Papers from Department of Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: I study the effect of fatigue and innate ability on performance in a model with incomplete contracts, lumpy tasks requiring multiple periods of work and stochastic productivity shocks. I find that increasing ability or reducing fatigue does not lead necessarily to more productive efficiency, since it may exacerbate the incentive for agents take "too much" on-the-job leisure. In a world with heterogenous agents, the problem may be ameliorated by the introduction of a dual labour market with free-lancers (who can take breaks at their discretion) and regular workers (who work on a fixed schedule).

Keywords: Breaks; leisure; productivity; freelancing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D0 D8 D9 M51 M55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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