Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types

Christian Ewerhart

No 159, ECON - Working Papers from Department of Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: Rent-seeking; private information; pure-strategy Nash equilibrium; existence; uniqueness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:econwp:159

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