A "fractal" solution to the chopstick auction

Christian Ewerhart

No 229, ECON - Working Papers from Department of Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: This paper constructs a novel equilibrium in the chopstick auction of Szentes and Rosenthal (Games and Economic Behavior, 2003a, 2003b). In contrast to the existing solution, the identified equilibrium strategy allows a simple and intuitive characterization. Moreover, its best-response set has the same Hausdorff dimension as its support, which may be seen as a robustness property. The analysis also reveals some new links to the literature on Blotto games.

Keywords: Chopstick auction; exposure problem; self-similarity; blotto games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-06, Revised 2017-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A “fractal” solution to the chopstick auction (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:econwp:229

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