Cooperation and Mistrust in Relational Contracts

Holger Herz, Armin Schmutzler and André Volk

No 233, ECON - Working Papers from Department of Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: Work and trade relationships are often governed by relational contracts, in which incentives for cooperative action today stem from the prospective future benefits of the relationship. In this paper, we study how reductions in clarity about the financial consequences of actions, induced by incomplete information about the costs of providing quality, affect relational contracts in buyer-seller relation- ships. Under incomplete information, payoffs to actions become private infor- mation. This can impede the joint understanding of what constitutes cooperative behavior, and may thus inject mistrust into relationships, even if credibility is held constant. Comparing seller-buyer relationships with and without complete infor- mation about seller costs in the laboratory, we find that such a lack of clarity has effects on the terms of relational contracts. However, these effects only concern the distribution of rents, and not efficiency.

Keywords: Relational contracts; incomplete information; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D03 L14 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/125681/1/econwp233.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Cooperation and mistrust in relational contracts (2019)
Working Paper: Cooperation and Mistrust in Relational Contracts (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:econwp:233

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