Designing dynamic research contests

Jean-Michel Benkert and Igor Letina

No 235, ECON - Working Papers from Department of Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: This paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim transfers, which are paid in every period while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that a contest where: (i) the principal can stop the contest in any period, (ii) a constant interim transfer is paid to agents in each period while the contest is ongoing, and (iii) a final prize is paid once the principal stops the contest, is optimal for the principal and implements the first-best.

Keywords: Innovation; dynamic contests; research contests; inducement prizes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 L19 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-09, Revised 2019-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Designing Dynamic Research Contests (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:econwp:235

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