Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players

Christian Ewerhart

No 243, ECON - Working Papers from Department of Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric Tullock contest is unique for parameter values r ≤ 2. This allows proving a revenue ranking result saying that a revenue-maximizing designer capable of biasing the contest always prefers a contest technology with higher accuracy.

Keywords: Tullock contest; Nash equilibrium; heterogeneous valuations; discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: The case of two players (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:econwp:243

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