Finite blockchain games

Christian Ewerhart

No 355, ECON - Working Papers from Department of Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: This paper studies the dynamic construction of a blockchain by competitive miners. In contrast to the literature, we assume a finite time horizon. It is shown that popular mining strategies such as adherence to conservative mining or to the longest-chain rule constitute pure-strategy Nash equilibria. However, these equilibria are not subgame perfect.

Keywords: Blockchain; proof-of-work; Nash equilibrium; subgame perfection; selfish mining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D72 E42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-07, Revised 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mac, nep-mic and nep-pay
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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