Social preferences over ordinal outcomes

Sandro Ambuehl and B. Douglas Bernheim
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Sandro Ambühl

No 395, ECON - Working Papers from Department of Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: We study social preferences in settings where someone who chooses on behalf of others knows how those individuals rank the available options but may lack cardinal information concerning those comparisons. Contrary to majoritarian principles, most people place more weight on preventing least-preferred outcomes for others than on enabling most-preferred outcomes. Ranks matter both intrinsically and because they provide a basis for inferring cardinal utility. Ordinal aggregation principles are stable across domains and countries with divergent political traditions. Designing attractive social choice mechanisms is challenging in practice partly because aggregation principles that make manipulation difficult yield outcomes people consider normatively unappealing.

JEL-codes: C91 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-09, Revised 2024-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-dcm, nep-exp, nep-isf and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:econwp:395

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