Design the Financial Tool to Promote Universal Free Access to AIDS Care

Patrick Leoni () and St�phane Luchini

No 214, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: Typical of the AIDS epidemics is that governments in developing countries under-invest in drugs production because of the possible appearance of a curative vaccine. We design a financial tool allowing to hedge against this event. We show that the introduction of this asset increases social welfare, as well as the number of patients treated and the provision of public good.

Keywords: option design; AIDS; social choices (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G13 I12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr and nep-hea
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