Unique Equilibria in the Rubinstein Bargaining Model when the Payoff Set is Non-Convex

Wolfgang F. Koehler

No 255, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: I give necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in a wide class of Rubinstein bargaining models. The requirements encompass a class of non-convex or disconnected payoff sets with discontinuous Pareto frontiers. The equilibrium of the non-cooperative game is unique if the objective function of the corresponding Nash-bargaining game has a unique maximum. I extend the analysis to games where the time between offers is not constant.

Keywords: Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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