Introducing Social Norms in Game Theory

Ra�l L�pez-P�rez
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Raúl López-Pérez

No 292, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: This paper explicitly introduces norms in games, assuming that they shape (some) players� utility and beliefs. People feel badly when they deviate from a binding norm, and the less other players deviate, the more badly they feel. Further, people anger at transgressors and get pleasure from punishing them. I then study how social norms and emotions affect cooperation, coordination, and punishment in a variety of games. The model is consistent with abundant experimental evidence that alternative models of social preferences cannot explain.

Keywords: Cooperation; Emotions; Focal Points; Punishment; Reciprocity; Social Norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D02 D62 D64 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-soc and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/52248/1/iewwp292.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:iewwpx:292

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Severin Oswald ().