Job design and randomization in principal agent models

Wolfgang R. K�hler

No 381, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: We analyze task allocation and randomization in Principal Agent models. We identify a new rationale that determines the allocation of tasks and show that it can be optimal to assign tasks that are very different to one agent. Similar to randomization, the reason to assign several tasks to one agent is to mitigate the effect of the participation constraint. We show that the allocation of tasks can be used as a substitute if randomization is not feasible.

Keywords: Job design; multi-task agency; ex-ante randomization; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cta and nep-lab
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:iewwpx:381

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