Natural resource distribution and multiple forms of civil war

Massimo Morelli () and Dominic Rohner

No 498, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: We examine how natural resource location, rent sharing and fighting capacities of different groups matter for ethnic conflict. A new type of bargaining failure due to multiple types of potential conflicts (and hence multiple threat points) is identified. The theory predicts conflict to be more likely when the geographical distribution of natural resources is uneven and when a minority group has better chances to win a secessionist rather than a centrist conflict. For sharing rents, resource proportionality is salient in avoiding secessions and strength proportionality in avoiding centrist civil wars. We present empirical evidence that is consistent with the model.

Keywords: Natural Resources; Conflict; Strength Proportionality; Resource Proportionality; Secession; Bargaining Failure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Natural Resource Distribution and Multiple Forms of Civil War (2010)
Working Paper: Natural Resource Distribution and Multiple Forms of Civil War (2010)
Working Paper: Natural Resource Distribution and Multiple Forms of Civil War (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:iewwpx:498

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