The "Flypaper Effect" Is Not an Anomaly
John Roemer () and
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2002, vol. 4, issue 1, pages 1-17
The empirical nonequivalence between grants by a central government and increases in community income (the "flypaper effect") has been considered anomalous. But the "anomaly" label is na*ve: in a multiconsumer community, equivalence demands an unlikely match of tax rules and income-growth patterns. We go beyond the single-policy-variable, median-voter model and apply Roemer's concept of Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium, which allows for party competition in multidimensional policy spaces. We compute the equilibria for a model with two independent policy variables (intercept and slope of an affine tax schedule) and obtain numerical values that agree with the empirical literature. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.
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Working Paper: The 'Flypaper Effect' is not an anomaly (2003)
Working Paper: THE ‘FLYPAPER EFFECT’ IS NOT AN ANOMALY
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