Electoral alliance and implemented redistribution: an interpretation on non-competitive politics of Japan

K. Terai

Applied Economics Letters, 2003, vol. 10, issue 4, 235-238

Abstract: This article shows that a pre-election alliance between the ruling coalition parties with different ideological motivations may result in bias toward the large size of government. In equilibrium, the reelected coalition government implements a redistributive policy that is greater than the median voter's preference. The results can explain why the Japanese coalition government, which colludes for winning elections, has frequently implemented more diffuse fiscal policies than the previous single-party government.

Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:10:y:2003:i:4:p:235-238

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DOI: 10.1080/1350485022000044110

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