Abstract:
This paper develops and calibrates a model of downtown parking in a city without mass transit, and applies it to investigate downtown parking policy. There is curbside and garage parking and traffic congestion. Spatial competition between private parking garages determines the equilibrium garage parking fee and spacing between parking garages. Curbside parking is priced below its social opportunity cost. Cruising for parking adjusts to equalize the full prices of on- and off-street parking, and contributes to traffic congestion. The central result is that raising curbside parking fees appears to be a very attractive policy since it generates efficiency gains that may be several times as large as the increased revenues raised.
Related works: Journal Article: Downtown parking in auto city (2009) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
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