A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues

Federico Echenique () and Mehmet B. Yenmez

No 1226, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Abstract: We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents’ preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The method requires no assumptions on preferences. Our method also finds certain partial solutions that may be useful when the core is empty.

Keywords: matching markets; core; lattice; Gale-Shapley algorithm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-06
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Published in Games and Economic Behavior 59 (2007) 46-71.

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Related works:
Working Paper: A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues (2005)
Working Paper: A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues (2005)
Journal Article: A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues (2007)
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