Handicaps on Timing to Improve Reputation

Amihai Glazer

No 111210, Working Papers from University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics

Abstract: An agent may be able to address a task at different times, with the state of nature more favorable to the task in some periods over others. Success on a task will therefore more greatly improve the agent's reputation following success on a task if he is constrained in choosing when to address the task than if he enjoys flexibility in timing. These considerations may explain why presidents emphasize achievements in their first hundred days in office, and why performance of the economy in only some quarters of a president's term affect elections.

Keywords: Reputation; Principal-agent; Policy making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2012-05
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