Details about Amihai Glazer

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Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine, (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Amihai Glazer.

Last updated 2009-10-26. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pgl23

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Working Papers

2009

1. Lobbying of Firms by Voters
   Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics
   Also in Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute (2009)

2008

2. Capital-Intensive Projects Induce More Effort Than Labor-Intensive Projects
   Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics
   Also in Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën (2008)
3. Crowding Out Wasteful Activities by Wasteful Activities
   Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics
4. Firms’ Ethics, Consumer Boycotts, and Signalling
   IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
   Also in CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich (2008)
5. Informational Benefits of International Environmental Agreements
   Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics
   Also in Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics (2008)
   Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën (2008)
6. Obtaining information by diversifying projects or why specialization is inefficient
   Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën
7. Reducing Current Taxes to Raise Future Revenue
   Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics
8. Regulation with Budget Constraints Can Dominate Regulation by Price and by Quantity
   Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics
9. Signaling Commitment by Excessive Spending
   Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics

2007

10. Competitive Proposals to Special Interests
    Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics
11. Earmarking: Bundling to Signal Quality
    Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics
12. Innovation and Imitation Across Jurisdictions
    Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics
13. Strategies of the Political Opposition
    Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics
14. Subsidizing Enjoyable Education
    Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute
    Also in CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich (2005)
    See also Journal Article in Labour Economics (2008)
15. The Preferences of Voters Over Road Tolls and Road Capacity
    Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics

2006

16. Externalities, Social Pressures, and Political Parties
    Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics
17. How To Avoid Awarding a Valuable Asset
    Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics
18. Predicting Committee Action
    Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics
19. Urban Extremism
    Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (2008)

2005

20. Competitive Proposals of Policies by Lobbies
    Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics
21. Direct Democracy and the Stability of State Policy
    Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics
22. Income Taxes, Property Values and Migration
    IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
    Also in CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich (2003)
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Public Economics (2008)
23. Migration in Search of Good Government
    Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics
    See also Journal Article in Regional Science and Urban Economics (2007)
24. The Desire for Impact
    CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Psychology (2008)

2004

25. High Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effect
    IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
    See also Journal Article in Economic Journal (2009)
26. Initial Luck, Status-Seeking and Snowballs Lead to Corporate Success and Failure
    IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
    Also in CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich (2004)
27. Optimal Incentive Contracts For a Worker Who Envies His Boss
    CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich

2002

28. Innovation of Network Goods: A Non-Innovating Firm Will Gain
    CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich View citations
29. The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects
    CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich View citations
    Also in University of Helsinki, Department of Economics, Department of Economics (2000)
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences (2000)

2001

30. Appropriation, Human Capital, and Mandatory Schooling
    CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich View citations
31. Bequests, Control Rights, and Cost-Benefit Analysis
    CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich
    See also Journal Article in European Journal of Political Economy (2003)
32. Credit Claiming
    Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics
    See also Journal Article in Economics of Governance (2005)
33. Reputation in Team Production
    Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics View citations
    Also in Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences (2000)
34. Subordinates as Threats to Leaders
    Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics
    Also in Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences (2000)
35. Taxation When Consumers Value Freedom
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences

2000

36. Differential Pricing and Mistake Avoidance
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
37. Investment in Human Capital, Appropriation, and Mandatory Schooling
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
38. Optimal Promotion and Span of Control
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
39. Optimal Term Length when Misinformation Increases with Experience
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
40. Term Length and the Quality of Appointment
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
    Also in University of Helsinki, Department of Economics, Department of Economics (2000) View citations
    CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich (2000)
41. The Calculus of Stonewalling
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences View citations
42. Theories of Delegation in Political Science
    Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business View citations
    Also in Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences (2000) View citations
43. Which Consumers Benefit from Congestion Tolls?
    Discussion Papers, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT) View citations

1999

44. A Theory of Compulsory Public Schooling
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
45. Allies as Rivals: Internal and External Rent Seeking
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2002)
46. Inequality when People Produce Best what they Consume
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences

1998

47. Evidence for the Irrationality of Governmental Policy
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
48. Political Biases Against Public Investment and Growth
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
49. Strategic Positioning and Campaining
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences View citations
50. Tax Rage
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
51. The Politics of State Gasoline Taxes
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
52. Time Consistency of Congestion Tolls
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences

1997

53. Election Surprises and Exchange rate Uncertainty
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article in Economics and Politics (1999)
54. Signaling By Choice Of Evaluation
    Working Papers, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics
55. Taxation of Rent-Seeking Activities
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences View citations
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Public Economics (1999)

1996

56. An Information Explanation for the Flypaper Effect
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
57. Bequests and Cost-Benefit Analysis
    Discussion Papers, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT)
    Also in Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences (1995)
58. Bureaucratic Creep
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
59. Markets Can Solve the Hold-Up Problem
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
60. Strategic Contributions to Induce Private Provision of the Public Good
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
61. Taxation of Emissions and Induce Investment
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences

1995

62. Credibility May Require Discretion, not Rules
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Public Economics (2000)
63. Imperfect Competition, Clubs, and Two-Part Tariffs
    Discussion Papers, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT)
64. Regulation by Price or by Command
    Discussion Papers, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT)
65. The Electoral Politics of Extreme Policies
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article in Economic Journal (1998)

1994

66. Electoral Incentives, Government Popularity, and Commitment of Policy
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
67. Governmental Failures in Evaluating Programs
    Public Economics, EconWPA
    See also Journal Article in Public Choice (1998)
68. How Regulations Can Succeed Where Taxes Do Not: An Examination of Automobile Fuel Efficiency
    Public Economics, EconWPA View citations

1993

69. Why Governments Commit to Unpopular Policies
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences

1992

70. Integration, Segregation and Discrimination in Clubs
    GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business
71. The Politics of Delay
    GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business

1991

72. A Signalling Explanation for Private Charity
    GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business View citations
73. COMMITMENT PROBLEMS JUSTIFY SUBSIDIES FOR MEDICAL INSURANCE
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
74. DELAY IN POLICY
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
75. Intertemporal Commitment Problems and Voting on Redistributive Taxation
    GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Urban Economics (1994)
76. POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM UNDER GROUP IDENTIFICATION
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences View citations
77. THE EVALUATION OF RISKY PROJECTS BY VOTERS
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
    Also in GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business (1991)
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Public Economics (1993)
78. The Economics of the Brass Paradox
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
79. private Proposition of Public Goods, Limited Tax Deductibility, and Crowding Out
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences

1990

80. MYOPIA, MISPERCEPTIONS, AND SOCIAL SECURITY
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
81. ON THE INCENTIVES TO ESTABLISH AND PLAY RENT-SEEKING GAMES
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
82. POLICY PROPOSALS UNDER CONTESTABILITY
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
83. WHY VOTERS MAY PREFER CONGESTED PUBLIC CLUBS
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Public Economics (1997)

1989

84. AN EXPRESSIVE VOTING THEORY OF STRIKES
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences View citations
    See also Journal Article in Economic Inquiry (1992)
85. IMPERFECT INFORMATION MY ALLEVIATE AGENCY PROBLEMS
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
86. THEORY OF PARKING
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences

1988

87. CANDIDATES SHOULD AVOID SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS IF VOTERS ARE IGNORANT
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
88. OPTIMAL SALES TO CONSUMERS WHO HOLD INVENTORY
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
89. THE SOCIAL DISCOUNT RATE UNDER MAJORITY VOTING
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
90. TURNOUT AND THE RATIONAL VOTER MODEL
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
91. WHY REPRESENTATIVES ARE IDEOLOGISTS THOUGH VOTERS ARE NOT
    Working Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences View citations

Journal Articles

2009

1. High Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effect
   Economic Journal, 2009, 119, (539), 1208-1224
   See also Working Paper (2004)
2. How to avoid transferring a valuable asset
   Public Choice, 2009, 138, (1), 3-8

2008

3. Bargaining with Rent Seekers
   Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2008, 10, (5), 859-871
4. Editorial announcement
   Economics of Governance, 2008, 9, (2), 101-101
5. Income taxes, property values, and migration
   Journal of Public Economics, 2008, 92, (3-4), 915-923
   See also Working Paper (2005)
6. Optimal Contracts When a Worker Envies His Boss
   Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2008, 24, (1), 120-137 View citations
7. Social security and conflict within the family
   Journal of Population Economics, 2008, 21, (2), 331-338
8. Subsidizing Enjoyable Education
   Labour Economics, 2008, 15, (5), 1023-1039 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2007)
9. The desire for impact
   Journal of Economic Psychology, 2008, 29, (3), 285-300 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2005)
10. Urban Extremism
    Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2008, 24, (2), 307-318
    See also Working Paper (2006)
11. Voting to anger and to please others
    Public Choice, 2008, 134, (3), 247-254

2007

12. Esteem and ignorance
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2007, 63, (3), 373-383 View citations
13. Introduction
    Economics of Governance, 2007, 8, (3), 179-179 View citations
14. Migration in search of good government
    Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2007, 37, (6), 703-716
    See also Working Paper (2005)
15. Short-term leaders should make long-term appointments
    International Tax and Public Finance, 2007, 14, (1), 55-69 View citations
16. Trade protection to reduce redistribution
    European Journal of Political Economy, 2007, 23, (3), 790-805

2006

17. Introduction
    Economics of Governance, 2006, 7, (1), 1-2
18. When a Loser Gains: Free Riding in the Innovation of Network Goods
    Journal of Economics, 2006, 87, (1), 55-71

2005

19. Credit claiming
    Economics of Governance, 2005, 6, (2), 125-137 View citations
    See also Working Paper (2001)
20. Elections with contribution-maximizing candidates
    Public Choice, 2005, 122, (3), 467-482 View citations
21. Taxation and pricing when consumers value freedom
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2005, 24, (2), 211-220

2004

22. Motivating devoted workers
    International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2004, 22, (3), 427-440 View citations
23. Strategic Investment by a Regulated Firm
    International Tax and Public Finance, 2004, 11, (2), 123-132
    Also in Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, 2004, 11, (2), 123-132 (2004)

2003

24. Bequests, control rights, and cost-benefit analysis
    European Journal of Political Economy, 2003, 19, (1), 71-82
    See also Working Paper (2001)
25. Consumption variety and urban agglomeration
    Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2003, 33, (6), 653-661
26. Preference heterogeneity, wage inequality, and trade
    Journal of International Economics, 2003, 60, (2), 455-469

2002

27. Allies as rivals: internal and external rent seeking
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2002, 48, (2), 155-162 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1999)
28. Federal grants and yardstick competition
    Journal of Urban Economics, 2002, 52, (1), 53-64 View citations

2001

29. Regulatory tune-ups
    Information Economics and Policy, 2001, 13, (4), 427-438
30. Special Issue on Social Conflict – Preface
    Economics of Governance, 2001, 2, (1), 1-1

2000

31. Credibility may require discretion, not rules
    Journal of Public Economics, 2000, 76, (2), 295-306 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1995)
32. Editors' introduction
    Economics of Governance, 2000, 1, (1), 1-2
33. Sequential Rent Seeking
    Public Choice, 2000, 102, (3-4), 219-28

1999

34. Election Surprises and Exchange Rate Uncertainty
    Economics and Politics, 1999, 11, (3), 255-274 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1997)
35. Increased capacity may exacerbate rationing problems: with applications to medical care
    Journal of Health Economics, 1999, 18, (5), 669-678
36. Local regulation may be excessively stringent
    Regional Science and Urban Economics, 1999, 29, (5), 553-558 View citations
37. Markets and Regulatory Hold-Up Problems
    Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1999, 37, (2), 151-164 View citations
38. Setting the Agenda: Electoral Competition, Commitment of Policy, and Issue Salience
    Public Choice, 1999, 99, (3-4), 377-94 View citations
39. Taxation of rent-seeking activities
    Journal of Public Economics, 1999, 72, (1), 61-72 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1997)

1998

40. A Neo-Downsian Model of Group-Oriented Voting and Racial Backlash
    Public Choice, 1998, 97, (1-2), 23-34
41. Governmental Failures in Evaluating Programs
    Public Choice, 1998, 94, (1-2), 105-15
    Also in Public Choice, 1998, 94, (1), 105-115 (1998)
    See also Working Paper (1994)
42. Optimal allocation of quotas
    Economics Letters, 1998, 58, (1), 55-61
43. The Electoral Politics of Extreme Policies
    Economic Journal, 1998, 108, (451), 1677-85 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1995)

1997

44. Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes
    Energy Policy, 1997, 25, (2), 255-257 View citations
45. On the uses of club theory: Preface to the club theory symposium
    Journal of Public Economics, 1997, 65, (1), 3-7 View citations
46. Wages and Employment in Public-Sector Unions
    Economic Inquiry, 1997, 35, (3), 532-43 View citations
47. Why voters may prefer congested public clubs
    Journal of Public Economics, 1997, 65, (1), 37-44 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1990)

1996

48. A Signaling Explanation for Charity
    American Economic Review, 1996, 86, (4), 1019-28 View citations
49. More monitoring can induce less effort
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1996, 30, (1), 113-123 View citations
50. Regulation by Prices and by Command
    Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1996, 9, (2), 191-97 View citations

1994

51. Does Electoral Uncertainty Cause Economic Fluctuations?
    American Economic Review, 1994, 84, (2), 169-73 View citations
52. Intertemporal Commitment Problems and Voting on Redistributive Taxation
    Journal of Urban Economics, 1994, 36, (3), 278-291 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1991)

1993

53. Ameliorating congestion by income redistribution
    Regional Science and Urban Economics, 1993, 23, (5), 579-584
54. On the Incentives to Establish and Play Political Rent-Seeking Games
    Public Choice, 1993, 75, (2), 139-48
55. Politics and the Choice of Durability: Reply
    American Economic Review, 1993, 83, (3), 674-75
56. The evaluation of risky projects by voters
    Journal of Public Economics, 1993, 52, (3), 377-390 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1991)

1992

57. Amend the Old or Address the New: Broad-Based Legislation When Proposing Policies Is Costly
    Public Choice, 1992, 74, (1), 43-58 View citations
58. An Expressive Voting Theory of Strikes
    Economic Inquiry, 1992, 30, (4), 733-41 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1989)
59. Parking fees and congestion
    Regional Science and Urban Economics, 1992, 22, (1), 123-132 View citations
60. Pricing by the Firm under Regulatory Threat
    The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1992, 107, (3), 1089-99 View citations

1991

61. Measuring the benefits derived from a transportation investment -- a comment
    Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 1991, 25, (6), 413-419
62. Ski-Lift Pricing with Applications to Labor and Other Markets: Comment
    American Economic Review, 1991, 81, (1), 376-77

1990

63. Optimal sales to users who hold inventory
    Economics Letters, 1990, 34, (3), 215-220
64. Voting and campaigning under incomplete information
    European Journal of Political Economy, 1990, 6, (1), 89-98

1989

65. Politics and the Choice of Durability
    American Economic Review, 1989, 79, (5), 1207-13 View citations

1988

66. Optimal Contests
    Economic Inquiry, 1988, 26, (1), 133-43 View citations

1985

67. The Advantages of Being First
    American Economic Review, 1985, 75, (3), 473-80 View citations
68. Using corrective taxes to remedy consumer misperceptions
    Journal of Public Economics, 1985, 28, (1), 85-94

1984

69. The Client Relationship and a "Just" Price
    American Economic Review, 1984, 74, (5), 1089-95

1983

70. ?/M/1: On the equilibrium distribution of customer arrivals
    European Journal of Operational Research, 1983, 13, (2), 146-150

1982

71. On the economics of subscriptions
    European Economic Review, 1982, 19, (2), 343-356 View citations

1981

72. Advertising, Information, and Prices-A Case Study
    Economic Inquiry, 1981, 19, (4), 661-71 View citations

Editor

1. Economics of Governance
   Springer