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Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core

Masahiro Kumabe and H. Reiju Mihara

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: It was shown earlier that the class of algorithmically computable simple games (i) includes the class of games that have finite carriers and (ii) is included in the class of games that have finite winning coalitions. This paper characterizes computable games, strengthens the earlier result that computable games violate anonymity, and gives examples showing that the above inclusions are strict. It also extends Nakamura’s theorem about the nonemptyness of the core and shows that computable simple games have a finite Nakamura number, implying that the number of alternatives that the players can deal with rationally is restricted.

Keywords: Voting games; infinitely many players; recursion theory; Turingcomputability; computable manuals and contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D90 C69 D71 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe
Date: 2006-07
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
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Downloads: (external link)
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/437/ original version (application/pdf)
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3296/ revised version (application/pdf)
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4403/ revised version (application/pdf)
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6803/ revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core (2008) Downloads
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