Details about H. Reiju Mihara

Access statistics for papers by H. Reiju Mihara.

Last updated 2008-11-25. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pmi193

Working Papers

2008

1. Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
2. The second-price auction solves King Solomon's dilemma
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany

2007

3. Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations
   See also Journal Article in Journal of Mathematical Economics (2008)
4. Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations
5. The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
   See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2008)

2004

6. Arrow's Theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators
   Public Economics, EconWPA View citations
   See also Journal Article in Journal of Mathematical Economics (1999)
7. Arrow's theorem, Weglorz' models and the axiom of choice
   Public Economics, EconWPA
8. Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
   Public Economics, EconWPA
   See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2000)
9. Existence of a Coalitionally Strategyproof Social Choice Function: A Constructive Proof
   Public Economics, EconWPA
   See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2001)
10. Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games
    Game Theory and Information, EconWPA View citations
    See also Journal Article in Mathematical Social Sciences (2004)

1998

11. Anonymity and Neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with Restricted Coalition Algebras
    Public Economics, EconWPA
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (1997)
12. Arrow's Theorem and Turing Computability
    Public Economics, EconWPA View citations
    Also in Working Papers, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research (1994)
    See also Journal Article in Economic Theory (1997)

Journal Articles

2008

1. Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
   Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2008, 44, (3-4), 348-366 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2007)
2. The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2008, 31, (4), 621-640 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2007)

2004

3. Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games
   Mathematical Social Sciences, 2004, 48, (3), 329-341 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2004)

2001

4. Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, 18, (3), 543-553 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2004)

2000

5. Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, 17, (3), 393-402 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2004)

1999

6. Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators1
   Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1999, 32, (3), 267-287
   See also Working Paper (2004)

1997

7. Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras
   Social Choice and Welfare, 1997, 14, (4), 503-512 View citations
   See also Working Paper (1998)
8. Arrow's Theorem and Turing computability
   Economic Theory, 1997, 10, (2), 257-276 View citations
   See also Working Paper (1998)