Details about H. Reiju Mihara

Access statistics for papers by H. Reiju Mihara.

Last updated 2013-06-17. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pmi193

Working Papers

2008

1. Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
   See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2011)
2. The second-price auction solves King Solomon's dilemma
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
   See also Journal Article in The Japanese Economic Review (2012)

2007

3. The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
   See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2008)

2006

4. Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (3)
   See also Journal Article in Journal of Mathematical Economics (2008)
5. Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (2)
   See also Journal Article in Journal of Mathematical Economics (2011)

2004

6. Arrow's Theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators
   Public Economics, EconWPA View citations (4)
7. Arrow's theorem, Weglorz' models and the axiom of choice
   Public Economics, EconWPA
8. Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
   Public Economics, EconWPA
   See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2000)
9. Existence of a Coalitionally Strategyproof Social Choice Function: A Constructive Proof
   Public Economics, EconWPA
   See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2001)
10. Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games
    Game Theory and Information, EconWPA View citations (3)
    See also Journal Article in Mathematical Social Sciences (2004)

1998

11. Anonymity and Neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with Restricted Coalition Algebras
    Public Economics, EconWPA
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (1997)
12. Arrow's Theorem and Turing Computability
    Public Economics, EconWPA View citations (3)
    Also in Working Papers, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research (1994)
    See also Journal Article in Economic Theory (1997)

Journal Articles

2012

1. THE SECOND-PRICE AUCTION SOLVES KING SOLOMON'S DILEMMA
   The Japanese Economic Review, 2012, 63, (3), 420-429
   See also Working Paper (2008)

2011

2. Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities
   Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, 47, (2), 150-158
   See also Working Paper (2006)
3. Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 72, (1), 187-201
   See also Working Paper (2008)

2008

4. Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
   Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2008, 44, (3-4), 348-366 View citations (5)
   See also Working Paper (2006)
5. The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2008, 31, (4), 621-640 View citations (3)
   See also Working Paper (2007)

2004

6. Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games
   Mathematical Social Sciences, 2004, 48, (3), 329-341 View citations (4)
   See also Working Paper (2004)

2001

7. Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, 18, (3), 543-553 View citations (5)
   See also Working Paper (2004)

2000

8. Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, 17, (3), 393-402 View citations (5)
   See also Working Paper (2004)

1999

9. Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators1
   Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1999, 32, (3), 267-287 View citations (2)

1997

10. Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras
    Social Choice and Welfare, 1997, 14, (4), 503-512 View citations (5)
    See also Working Paper (1998)
11. Arrow's Theorem and Turing computability
    Economic Theory, 1997, 10, (2), 257-276 View citations (11)
    See also Working Paper (1998)