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Details about H. Reiju Mihara

Homepage:http://www5.atwiki.jp/reiju/
Postal address:Kagawa University Library, Takamatsu 760-8525, Japan
Workplace:Kagawa University Library

Access statistics for papers by H. Reiju Mihara.

Last updated 2017-08-06. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pmi193


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Working Papers

2017

  1. Characterizing the Borda ranking rule for a fixed population
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads

2008

  1. Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2011)
  2. The second-price auction solves King Solomon's dilemma
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article in The Japanese Economic Review (2012)

2007

  1. The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2008)

2006

  1. Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (3)
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Mathematical Economics (2008)
  2. Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (2)
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Mathematical Economics (2011)

2004

  1. Arrow's Theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators
    Public Economics, EconWPA Downloads View citations (8)
  2. Arrow's theorem, Weglorz' models and the axiom of choice
    Public Economics, EconWPA Downloads
  3. Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
    Public Economics, EconWPA Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2000)
  4. Existence of a Coalitionally Strategyproof Social Choice Function: A Constructive Proof
    Public Economics, EconWPA Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2001)
  5. Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games
    Game Theory and Information, EconWPA Downloads View citations (4)
    See also Journal Article in Mathematical Social Sciences (2004)

1998

  1. Anonymity and Neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with Restricted Coalition Algebras
    Public Economics, EconWPA Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (1997)
  2. Arrow's Theorem and Turing Computability
    Public Economics, EconWPA Downloads View citations (2)
    Also in Working Papers, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research (1994)

    See also Journal Article in Economic Theory (1997)

Journal Articles

2012

  1. THE SECOND-PRICE AUCTION SOLVES KING SOLOMON'S DILEMMA
    The Japanese Economic Review, 2012, 63, (3), 420-429 Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper (2008)

2011

  1. Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, 47, (2), 150-158 Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper (2006)
  2. Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 72, (1), 187-201 Downloads View citations (2)
    See also Working Paper (2008)

2008

  1. Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2008, 44, (3-4), 348-366 Downloads View citations (5)
    See also Working Paper (2006)
  2. The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2008, 31, (4), 621-640 Downloads View citations (4)
    See also Working Paper (2007)

2004

  1. Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2004, 48, (3), 329-341 Downloads View citations (5)
    See also Working Paper (2004)

2001

  1. Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, 18, (3), 543-553 Downloads View citations (6)
    See also Working Paper (2004)

2000

  1. Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, 17, (3), 393-402 Downloads View citations (7)
    See also Working Paper (2004)

1999

  1. Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators1
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1999, 32, (3), 267-287 Downloads View citations (3)

1997

  1. Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras
    Social Choice and Welfare, 1997, 14, (4), 503-512 Downloads View citations (7)
    See also Working Paper (1998)
  2. Arrow's Theorem and Turing computability
    Economic Theory, 1997, 10, (2), 257-276 Downloads View citations (15)
    See also Working Paper (1998)
 
Page updated 2017-08-07