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Details about H. Reiju Mihara
Access statistics for papers by H. Reiju Mihara.
Last updated 2008-11-25. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pmi193
Jump to Journal Articles
Working Papers
2008
- Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
- The second-price auction solves King Solomon's dilemma
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
2007
- Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations
See also Journal Article in Journal of Mathematical Economics (2008)
- Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations
- The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 
See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2008)
2004
- Arrow's Theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators
Public Economics, EconWPA View citations
See also Journal Article in Journal of Mathematical Economics (1999)
- Arrow's theorem, Weglorz' models and the axiom of choice
Public Economics, EconWPA
- Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
Public Economics, EconWPA 
See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2000)
- Existence of a Coalitionally Strategyproof Social Choice Function: A Constructive Proof
Public Economics, EconWPA 
See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2001)
- Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games
Game Theory and Information, EconWPA View citations
See also Journal Article in Mathematical Social Sciences (2004)
1998
- Anonymity and Neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with Restricted Coalition Algebras
Public Economics, EconWPA 
See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (1997)
- Arrow's Theorem and Turing Computability
Public Economics, EconWPA View citations
Also in Working Papers, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research (1994)
See also Journal Article in Economic Theory (1997)
Journal Articles
2008
- Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2008, 44, (3-4), 348-366 View citations
See also Working Paper (2007)
- The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
Social Choice and Welfare, 2008, 31, (4), 621-640 View citations
See also Working Paper (2007)
2004
- Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2004, 48, (3), 329-341 View citations
See also Working Paper (2004)
2001
- Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof
Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, 18, (3), 543-553 View citations
See also Working Paper (2004)
2000
- Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, 17, (3), 393-402 View citations
See also Working Paper (2004)
1999
- Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators1
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1999, 32, (3), 267-287 
See also Working Paper (2004)
1997
- Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras
Social Choice and Welfare, 1997, 14, (4), 503-512 View citations
See also Working Paper (1998)
- Arrow's Theorem and Turing computability
Economic Theory, 1997, 10, (2), 257-276 View citations
See also Working Paper (1998)
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