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The Effect of Reputation on Selling Prices in Auctions

Oliver Gürtler () and Christian Grund

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: In economic approaches it is often argued that reputation considerations influence the behavior of individuals or firms and that reputation influences the outcome of markets. Empirical evidence is rare though. In this contribution we argue that a positive reputation of sellers should have an effect on selling prices. Analyzing auctions of popular DVDs at eBay we, indeed, find support for this hypothesis. Secondary, we unmask the myth that it is promising for eBay sellers to let their auction end at the evening, when many potential buyers may be online.

Keywords: Reputation; eBay feedback system; auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 K12 L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cul, nep-ind, nep-law and nep-mic
Date: 2006-05
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Journal Article: The Effect of Reputation on Selling Prices in Auctions (2008) Downloads
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trf:wpaper:114

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