Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations over a Single Good

Marco Li Calzi () and Antonio Nicolo' ()

No 152, Working Papers from Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Venice

Abstract: This paper studies efficient and egalitarian allocations over a single heterogeneous and infinitely divisible good. We prove the existence of such allocations using only measure-theoretic arguments. Under the additional assumption of complete information, we identify a sufficient condition on agents' preferences that makes it possible to apply the Pazner-Schmeidler rule for uniquely selecting an efficient egalitarian equivalent allocation. Finally, we exhibit a simple procedure that implements the Pazner-Schmeidler selection in a subgame-perfect equilibrium.

Keywords: egalitarism; equity; fair division; implementation; no-envy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 C70 D30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-06

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Related works:
Working Paper: Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations over a Single Good (2005)
Journal Article: Efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations over a single good (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vnm:wpaper:152

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