Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations over a Single Good

Marco Li Calzi () and Antonio Nicolo' ()

Abstract: This paper studies efficient and egalitarian allocations over a single heterogeneous and infinitely divisible good. We prove the existence of such allocations using only measure-theoretic arguments. Under the additional assumption of complete information, we identify a sufficient condition on agents’ preferences that makes it possible to apply the Pazner-Schmeidler rule for uniquely selecting an efficient egalitarian equivalent allocation. Finally, we exhibit a simple procedure that implements the Pazner-Schmeidler selection in a subgame-perfect equilibrium.

Keywords: egalitarism; equity; fair division; implementation; no-envy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D1 D2 D3 D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written 2005-10-31
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 20. 20 pages, pdf, prepared from pdftex
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http://129.3.20.41/eps/mic/papers/0510/0510014.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations over a Single Good (2007)
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