Details about Omar Azfar

This author is deceased (2009-01-21).

Access statistics for papers by Omar Azfar.

Last updated 2023-03-10. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: paz8

Working Papers

2006

1. Which incentives work? An experimental analysis of incentives for trainers
   Natural Field Experiments, The Field Experiments Website View citations (13)

2005

2. Identifying Reticent Respondents: Assessing the Quality of Survey Data on Corruption and Values
   Electronic Working Papers, University of Maryland, Department of Economics View citations (11)
   See also Journal Article in Economic Development and Cultural Change (2009)

2004

3. Which incentives work and when? An experimental analysis of incentives for trainers
   Framed Field Experiments, The Field Experiments Website

2000

4. Are larger countries really more corrupt?
   Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank View citations (20)
5. Gender and Corruption
   Department of Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics, Williams College View citations (7)
   Also in Center for Development Economics, Department of Economics, Williams College (2000) View citations (9)
   See also Journal Article in Journal of Development Economics (2001)

Journal Articles

2009

1. Identifying Reticent Respondents: Assessing the Quality of Survey Data on Corruption and Values
   Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2009, 57, (2), 387-411 View citations (34)
   See also Working Paper (2005)

2008

2. Does corruption affect health outcomes in the Philippines?
   Economics of Governance, 2008, 9, (3), 197-244 View citations (52)

2007

3. Corruption and trade regulations: an instrumental variable approach
   Applied Economics Letters, 2007, 15, (3), 231-234 View citations (1)
4. Transparency, wages, and the separation of powers: An experimental analysis of corruption
   Public Choice, 2007, 130, (3), 471-493 View citations (60)

2006

5. The New Institutional Economics Approach to Economic Development: A Discussion of Social, Political, Legal, and Economic Institutions
   The Pakistan Development Review, 2006, 45, (4), 965-980 View citations (8)

2003

6. Market-Mobilized Capital
   Public Choice, 2003, 117, (3-4), 357-72 View citations (1)
7. Trade intensity, country size and corruption
   Economics of Governance, 2003, 4, (1), 1-18 View citations (112)

2002

8. The Natural Economic Advantage of Dictatorship over Democracy: A “Gresham's Law” of Governance
   International Tax and Public Finance, 2002, 9, (4), 451-463 View citations (2)

2001

9. Gender and corruption
   Journal of Development Economics, 2001, 64, (1), 25-55 View citations (345)
   See also Working Paper (2000)
10. Profit-Sharing, Employment Stability, and Wage Growth
    ILR Review, 2001, 54, (3), 619-630 View citations (18)
11. The Causes and Consequences of Corruption
    The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2001, 573, (1), 42-56 View citations (2)

1999

12. Rationalizing hyperbolic discounting
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1999, 38, (2), 245-252 View citations (52)

Chapters

2001

1. The logic of collective action
   Chapter 3 in The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, 2001