Details about Chang Koo Chi
Access statistics for papers by Chang Koo Chi.
Last updated 2023-03-16. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pch1665
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Working Papers
2019
- Performance Measurement in Agency Models
Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics
2018
- An analysis of the two-bidder all-pay auction with common values
Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics
- Relational Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement
Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics View citations (3)
Also in Discussion Papers, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science (2018) View citations (3)
2017
- All-Pay Auctions with Affiliated Values
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
Also in Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics (2017) View citations (1)
- War of attrition with affiliated values
Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics
2016
- The Impact of Firm Size on Dynamic Incentives and Investment
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 
See also Journal Article The impact of firm size on dynamic incentives and investment, RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation (2017) View citations (4) (2017)
Journal Articles
2019
- All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals
Journal of Economic Theory, 2019, 179, (C), 99-130 View citations (6)
2017
- The impact of firm size on dynamic incentives and investment
RAND Journal of Economics, 2017, 48, (1), 147-177 View citations (4)
See also Working Paper The Impact of Firm Size on Dynamic Incentives and Investment, MPRA Paper (2016) (2016)
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