All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals
Chang Koo Chi (),
Pauli Murto and
Journal of Economic Theory, 2019, vol. 179, issue C, 99-130
We analyze all-pay auctions with affiliated values and binary signals. We analyze the unique symmetric equilibrium with any number of bidders and show that the bidders earn positive rents only if the equilibrium is monotone. We also characterize the symmetric equilibrium of the closely related two-player war of attrition.
Keywords: All-pay auctions; War of attrition; Common values; Affiliated signals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:179:y:2019:i:c:p:99-130
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