Details about Francesco Lancia
Access statistics for papers by Francesco Lancia.
Last updated 2020-12-31. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pla284
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Working Papers
2020
- Optimal Sustainable Intergenerational Insurance
Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh 
Also in CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2020)
- Policies and Instruments for Self-Enforcing Treaties
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 
Also in CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo (2020)  CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy (2020)
2017
- Sustainable Intergenerational Insurance
2017 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics
- Youth Enfranchisement, Political Responsiveness and Education Expenditure: Evidence from the U.S
IZA Discussion Papers, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) View citations (4)
Also in CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2017) View citations (7)
See also Journal Article in American Economic Journal: Economic Policy (2020)
2016
- Cooperation in Organization through Self-Commitment Actions
Vienna Economics Papers, University of Vienna, Department of Economics View citations (1)
2015
- Compliance Technology and Self-Enforcing Agreements
CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo View citations (8)
See also Journal Article in Journal of the European Economic Association (2019)
- Public Education and Pensions in Democracy: A Political Economy Theory
Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics View citations (10)
See also Journal Article in Journal of the European Economic Association (2016)
2013
- A Dynamic Politico-Economic Model of Intergenerational contracts
Vienna Economics Papers, University of Vienna, Department of Economics View citations (7)
Also in MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2010) View citations (3) Center for Economic Research (RECent), University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi" (2010) View citations (1) 2011 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics (2011) View citations (3)
2011
- Self-Commitment-Institutions and Cooperation in Overlapping Generations Games
Center for Economic Research (RECent), University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi" 
Also in Department of Economics, University of Modena and Reggio E., Faculty of Economics "Marco Biagi" (2011)
2007
- A Politico-Economic Model of Aging, Technology Adoption and Growth
Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) 
Also in Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (2007)  Working Papers, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna (2007) 
See also Journal Article in Journal of Population Economics (2012)
Journal Articles
2020
- Youth Enfranchisement, Political Responsiveness, and Education Expenditure: Evidence from the US
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2020, 12, (3), 76-106 View citations (1)
See also Working Paper (2017)
2019
- Compliance Technology and Self-enforcing Agreements
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2019, 17, (1), 1-29 View citations (12)
See also Working Paper (2015)
- Sustaining Cooperation Through Strategic Self-Interested Actions
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2019, 19, (2), 11
2016
- PUBLIC EDUCATION AND PENSIONS IN DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORY
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2016, 14, (5), 1038-1073 View citations (16)
Also in Journal of the European Economic Association, 2016, 14, (5), 1038-1073 (2016) View citations (12)
See also Working Paper (2015)
2012
- A politico-economic model of aging, technology adoption and growth
Journal of Population Economics, 2012, 25, (3), 989-1018 View citations (10)
See also Working Paper (2007)
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