A Dynamic Politico-Economic Model of Intergenerational contracts
Francesco Lancia and
Alessia Russo
Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics
Abstract:
This paper proposes a dynamic politico-economic theory of intergenerational contracts, whose driving force is the intergenerational confict over government spending. Embedding a repeated probabilistic voting setup in a standard OLG model with human capital accumulation, we find that the empowerment of elderly constituencies is key in order to enforce productive policies. The paper characterizes the Markov-perfect equilibrium of the voting game, as well as the welfare properties. The main results are: (i) the existence of a Markov-perfect equilibrium which attains a growth- enhancing intergenerational contract does not require pre-commitment through the establishment of long-lasting institutions; (ii) the political sustainability of the intergenerational contract relies solely on the politico-economic fundamentals that are payoff-relevant for future constituents; (iii) the implementation of pork-barrel transfers does not necessarily crowd out productive public investment; and, (iv) the greater the degree of intergenerational con?icts over the government spending, the lower the ineffciency.
JEL-codes: D72 E62 H23 H30 H53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)
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https://papersecon.univie.ac.at/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie1304.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: A Dynamic Politico-Economic Model of Intergenerational Contracts (2011) 
Working Paper: A Dynamic Politico-Economic Model of Intergenerational Contracts (2010) 
Working Paper: A Dynamic Politico-Economic Model of Intergenerational Contracts (2010) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:vie1304
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