Details about Anat Lerner
Access statistics for papers by Anat Lerner.
Last updated 2020-08-20. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Jump to Journal Articles
- Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods
CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) View citations (9)
Also in Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany (1998) View citations (2)
CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1998)
See also Journal Article in Journal of Public Economic Theory (2001)
- Auctioning public goods to groups of aghents
CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
- Efficient Constrained Combinatorial Auctions
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2016, 18, (03), 1-10
- Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2015, 17, (04), 1-25 View citations (1)
- Characterizing the Incentive Compatible and Pareto Optimal Efficiency Space for Two Players, k Items, Public Budget and Quasilinear Utilities
Games, 2014, 5, (2), 1-19 View citations (1)
- Two-Outcome dictatorial mechanisms in constrained combinatorial auctions
Economics Bulletin, 2014, 34, (2), 810-818
- Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2013, 13, (1), 18 View citations (2)
- The Incompatibility of Pareto Optimality and Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatibility in Sufficiently-Anonymous Budget-Constrained Quasilinear Settings
Games, 2013, 4, (4), 1-21
- Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2001, 3, (4), 501-525
See also Working Paper (2001)
- A Pie Allocation Among Sharing Groups
Games and Economic Behavior, 1998, 22, (2), 316-330 View citations (7)
The links between different versions of a paper are constructed automatically by matching on the titles.
Please contact if a link is incorrect.
Use this form
to add links between versions where the titles do not match.