Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods

Dirk Alboth, Anat Lerner () and Jonathan Shalev ()

No 1596, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Date: 2001-01-01
Note: In : Journal of Public Economic Theory, 3(4), 501-525, 2001
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Related works:
Journal Article: Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods (2001)
Working Paper: Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods (1998)
Working Paper: Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods (1998)
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