Details about Nicolas Melissas
Access statistics for papers by Nicolas Melissas.
Last updated 2013-02-05. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pme98
Jump to Journal Articles
Working Papers
2010
- Technology Adoption, Social Learning, and Economic Policy
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich View citations (1)
Also in Working Papers, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM (2010)  ESMT Research Working Papers, ESMT European School of Management and Technology (2010) View citations (1)
2009
- On Bid Disclosure in OCS Wildcat Auctions
Working Papers, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM
2008
- Bidding and Drilling on Offshore Wildcat Tracts
Working Papers, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM View citations (1)
2007
- Gurus, Opinion Polls and Social Learning
Working Papers, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM
- The Trader, the Market Maker, his Guru and her Information
Working Papers, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM
2006
- Corruption, Extortion, and the Boundaries of the Law
Working Papers, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM View citations (3)
See also Journal Article Corruption, Extortion, and the Boundaries of the Law, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press (2009) View citations (2) (2009)
2005
- Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The Role of Cohort Effects
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations (3)
Also in Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003, Royal Economic Society (2003) View citations (2) CIG Working Papers, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG) (2003) View citations (10)
See also Journal Article Equilibria in a dynamic global game: the role of cohort effects, Economic Theory, Springer (2006) View citations (25) (2006)
2004
- Informational Cascades Elicit Private Information
CIG Working Papers, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG) 
Also in Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany (2004) View citations (3)
See also Journal Article INFORMATIONAL CASCADES ELICIT PRIVATE INFORMATION *, International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association (2006) View citations (6) (2006)
2000
- Herd Behaviour as an Incentive Scheme
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society 
See also Journal Article Herd behaviour as an incentive scheme, Economic Theory, Springer (2005) View citations (5) (2005)
Journal Articles
2012
- Rational exuberance
European Economic Review, 2012, 56, (6), 1220-1240 View citations (1)
2009
- Corruption, Extortion, and the Boundaries of the Law
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2009, 25, (2), 442-471 View citations (2)
See also Working Paper Corruption, Extortion, and the Boundaries of the Law, Working Papers (2006) View citations (3) (2006)
2006
- Equilibria in a dynamic global game: the role of cohort effects
Economic Theory, 2006, 28, (3), 531-557 View citations (25)
See also Working Paper Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The Role of Cohort Effects, CEPR Discussion Papers (2005) View citations (3) (2005)
- INFORMATIONAL CASCADES ELICIT PRIVATE INFORMATION *
International Economic Review, 2006, 47, (1), 297-325 View citations (6)
See also Working Paper Informational Cascades Elicit Private Information, CIG Working Papers (2004) (2004)
2005
- Herd behaviour as an incentive scheme
Economic Theory, 2005, 26, (3), 517-536 View citations (5)
See also Working Paper Herd Behaviour as an Incentive Scheme, Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers (2000) (2000)
|
The links between different versions of a paper are constructed automatically by matching on the titles.
Please contact if a link is incorrect.
Use this form
to add links between versions where the titles do not match.
|