Corruption, Extortion, and the Boundaries of the Law
Nicolas Melissas
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Svetlana Andrianova
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2009, vol. 25, issue 2, 442-471
Abstract:
We consider a setup in which a principal must decide whether or not to legalize a socially undesirable activity. The law is enforced by a monitor who may be bribed to conceal evidence of the offense and who may also engage in extortionary practices. The principal may legalize the activity even if it is a very harmful one. The principal may also declare the activity illegal knowing that the monitor will abuse the law to extract bribes out of innocent people. Our model offers a novel rationale for legalizing possession and consumption of drugs while continuing to prosecute drug dealers. (JEL D82, L22, K4) The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.
Date: 2009
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Working Paper: Corruption, Extortion, and the Boundaries of the Law (2006) 
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