Details about Arijit Mukherjee
Access statistics for papers by Arijit Mukherjee.
Last updated 2014-01-24. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pmu319
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Working Papers
2010
- Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts
FEUNL Working Paper Series, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia View citations (9)
See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (2011)
Journal Articles
2013
- Strategic information revelation when experts compete to influence
RAND Journal of Economics, 2013, 44, (3), 522-544 View citations (17)
2012
- Star Wars: Exclusive Talent and Collusive Outcomes in Labor Markets
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2012, 28, (4), 754-782 View citations (8)
2011
- Interim Performance Feedback in Multistage Tournaments: The Optimality of Partial Disclosure
Journal of Labor Economics, 2011, 29, (2), 229 - 265 View citations (35)
- Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts
RAND Journal of Economics, 2011, 42, (1), 44-69 View citations (13)
See also Working Paper (2010)
2010
- Deregulation redux: does mandating access to bottleneck facilities necessarily improve welfare?
Public Choice, 2010, 142, (3), 363-377 View citations (1)
- The optimal disclosure policy when firms offer implicit contracts
RAND Journal of Economics, 2010, 41, (3), 549-573 View citations (4)
2009
- Disclosure or secrecy? The dynamics of Open Science
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2009, 27, (3), 449-462 View citations (27)
2008
- CAREER CONCERNS, MATCHING, AND OPTIMAL DISCLOSURE POLICY
International Economic Review, 2008, 49, (4), 1211-1250 View citations (23)
- Sustaining implicit contracts when agents have career concerns: the role of information disclosure
RAND Journal of Economics, 2008, 39, (2), 469-490 View citations (12)
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