Details about Tymofiy Mylovanov
Access statistics for papers by Tymofiy Mylovanov.
Last updated 2015-10-06. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pmy38
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Working Papers
2014
- Deliberation and Security Design in Bankruptcy
Working Papers, Rice University, Department of Economics View citations (3)
2013
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: The Quasi-Linear Private-Values Case
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich View citations (7)
2011
- Should the Flatterers be Avoided?
2011 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics
2010
- Contracts for Experts with Opposing Interests
Discussion Papers, Kyiv School of Economics
- Credibility for Sale - The Effect of Disclosure on Information Acquisition and Transmission
Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ View citations (1)
Also in Working Papers, Concordia University, Department of Economics (2009)
- Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Privacy of Information
2010 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics View citations (1)
2007
- Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations (2)
See also Journal Article Task scheduling and moral hazard, Economic Theory, Springer (2008) View citations (8) (2008)
2006
- A Characterization of the Conditions for Optimal Auction with Resale
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich View citations (3)
2005
- First-mover disadvantage
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich
- Veto-Based Delegation
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich View citations (1)
See also Journal Article Veto-based delegation, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (2008) View citations (40) (2008)
2004
- Failure to Delegate and Loss of Control
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich
Journal Articles
2015
- Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability
Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, 159, (PA), 280-289 View citations (10)
2014
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: Private Values with Transferable Utility
The Review of Economic Studies, 2014, 81, (4), 1668-1707 View citations (33)
2013
- Decision rules revealing commonly known events
Economics Letters, 2013, 119, (1), 8-10 View citations (4)
2012
- Diverging Opinions
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2012, 4, (1), 209-32 View citations (19)
2009
- Optimal auction with resale—a characterization of the conditions
Economic Theory, 2009, 40, (3), 509-528 View citations (7)
- Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case
Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 144, (4), 1373-1395 View citations (61)
2008
- Task scheduling and moral hazard
Economic Theory, 2008, 37, (2), 307-320 View citations (8)
See also Working Paper Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard, CEPR Discussion Papers (2007) View citations (2) (2007)
- Veto-based delegation
Journal of Economic Theory, 2008, 138, (1), 297-307 View citations (40)
See also Working Paper Veto-Based Delegation, Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (2005) View citations (1) (2005)
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