Details about Lucía Quesada
Access statistics for papers by Lucía Quesada.
Last updated 2013-06-12. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
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- (Corporate Governance Series 003) The Ownership of Ratings
FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group
- Collusion as an Informed Principal Problem
Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (14)
- The Ownership of Ratings
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations (37)
See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (2009)
- Trade Balance Constraints and Optimal Regulation
Industrial Organization, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (2)
Also in UADE Working Papers, Instituto de Economía, Universidad Argentina de la Empresa (2005)
- Modeling collusion as an informed principal problem
Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (3)
- Monopoly intermediary and information transmission
Industrial Organization, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
- Concession contract renegotiations: some efficiency versus equity dilemmas
Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank View citations (11)
- Network Competition and Network Regulation
UADE Working Papers, Instituto de Economía, Universidad Argentina de la Empresa View citations (3)
- Intermediaries, Credibility and Incentives to Collude
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2011, 20, (4), 1099-1133 View citations (17)
- The ownership of ratings
RAND Journal of Economics, 2009, 40, (2), 234-257 View citations (24)
See also Working Paper (2005)
- Comment on "The Impact of Incentives on Human Behavior: Can We Make it Disappear? The Case of the Death Penalty"
A chapter in The Economics of Crime: Lessons for and from Latin America, 2010, pp 418-420
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