Cooperation among Strangers in the Presence of Defectors: An Experimental Study

Luciana Moscoso Boedo, Lucía Quesada and Marcela Tarazona

No DTE 567, Working Papers from CIDE, División de Economía

Abstract: Does the rotten apple spoils his companions? This is the question we analyze in the context of a repeated population game with behavioral types. Our experimental results show that the inclusion of a non-cooperative player in an anonymous community makes cooperation much more difficult to sustain but that individuals still manage to trust some of the permanent players of society. The rotten apple lowers the quality of the companions, but is not able to completely spoil them.

Keywords: Population games; anonymous random matching; social norms. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2013-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.economiamexicana.cide.edu/RePEc/emc/pdf/DTE/DTE567.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:emc:wpaper:dte567

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from CIDE, División de Economía Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mateo Hoyos ().