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Details about J. Philipp Reiss

Homepage:http://io.econ.kit.edu
Workplace:Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften (Department of Economics and Business Engineering), Karlsruhe Institut für Technologie (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology), (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by J. Philipp Reiss.

Last updated 2017-02-17. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pre114


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Working Papers

2017

  1. Opportunity cost, inattention and the bidder's curse
    Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University Downloads

2014

  1. Behavioral variation in Tullock contests
    Working Paper Series in Economics, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management Downloads View citations (19)

2013

  1. Could we overcome the Winner's Curse by (behavioral) auction design?
    VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association Downloads View citations (2)

2012

  1. Incentive Effects of Funding Contracts: An Experiment
    Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz Downloads View citations (1)
    Also in TWI Research Paper Series, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz (2012) Downloads View citations (1)
    TWI Research Paper Series, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz (2011) Downloads

    See also Journal Article Incentive effects of funding contracts: an experiment, Experimental Economics, Springer (2014) Downloads View citations (1) (2014)

2008

  1. A pure variation of risk in first-price auctions
    Jena Economics Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena Downloads View citations (9)
    Also in Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) (2006) Downloads View citations (3)
  2. A pure variation of risk in private-value auctions
    Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) Downloads View citations (2)
  3. Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and markdown bidders - Theory and Experiment
    Jena Economics Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena Downloads View citations (10)
  4. Out-of equilibrium bids in auctions - Wrong expectations or wrong bids
    Jena Economics Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena Downloads View citations (1)
  5. Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction
    Jena Economics Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena Downloads View citations (4)
    See also Journal Article Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction, European Economic Review, Elsevier (2009) Downloads View citations (24) (2009)

2007

  1. First-Price Equilibrium and Revenue Equivalence in a Sequential Procurement Auction Model
    Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) Downloads
    See also Journal Article First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model, Economic Theory, Springer (2010) Downloads View citations (4) (2010)
  2. Non-monotonic repayment contracts are superior: an experimental approach
    Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) Downloads

2005

  1. The Size and Performance of Public Sector Activities in Europe
    WIFO Working Papers, WIFO Downloads View citations (8)
    Also in Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany (2005) Downloads View citations (16)

2004

  1. Bidding with Outside Options
    Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim Downloads View citations (2)
    Also in Papers, Sonderforschungsbreich 504 (2004) Downloads View citations (2)
  2. On Entry And Bidding In Sequential Procurement Auctions
    Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004, Royal Economic Society Downloads View citations (1)
  3. The overbidding-myth and the underbidding-bias in first-price auctions
    Papers, Sonderforschungsbreich 504 Downloads View citations (4)
    Also in Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim (2004) Downloads View citations (6)

Journal Articles

2014

  1. Incentive effects of funding contracts: an experiment
    Experimental Economics, 2014, 17, (4), 586-614 Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper Incentive Effects of Funding Contracts: An Experiment, Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz (2012) Downloads View citations (1) (2012)

2011

  1. Out‐Of‐Equilibrium Bids in First‐Price Auctions: Wrong Expectations or Wrong Bids
    Economic Journal, 2011, 121, (557), 1361-1397 Downloads View citations (29)

2010

  1. First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model
    Economic Theory, 2010, 43, (1), 99-141 Downloads View citations (4)
    See also Working Paper First-Price Equilibrium and Revenue Equivalence in a Sequential Procurement Auction Model, Research Memorandum (2007) Downloads (2007)

2009

  1. Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction
    European Economic Review, 2009, 53, (2), 153-169 Downloads View citations (24)
    See also Working Paper Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction, Jena Economics Research Papers (2008) Downloads View citations (4) (2008)

2007

  1. Entry decisions and bidding behavior in sequential first-price procurement auctions: An experimental study
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 58, (1), 50-74 Downloads View citations (22)

2005

  1. Entrepreneurs, moral hazard, and endogenous growth
    Journal of Macroeconomics, 2005, 27, (1), 69-86 Downloads View citations (1)
 
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