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First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model

J. Philipp Reiss and Jens Schöndube ()

Economic Theory, 2010, vol. 43, issue 1, 99-141

Keywords: Sequential first-price auctions; Revenue equivalence; Endogenous outside options; Procurement auction; Capacity constraints; C72; D44; L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Working Paper: First-Price Equilibrium and Revenue Equivalence in a Sequential Procurement Auction Model (2007) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-008-0428-7

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