Economic Theory

1991 - 2026

Current editor(s): Nichoals Yanneils

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Springer
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)
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Volume 82, issue 1, 2026

Quasiconvex Aggregate Demand and Fourth-Order Price Effect: Unique Equilibrium pp. 1-54

Dong Chul Won

Time preference and productivity: observations in a growth model with heterogeneous agents pp. 55-79

Gerhard Sorger

Sequential dictatorship rules in multi-unit object assignment problems with money pp. 81-120

Masahiro Kawasaki, Ryosuke Sakai and Tomoya Kazumura

Potential in population games pp. 121-158

Igal Milchtaich

How and when to announce contest outcomes under peak-trough preferences? pp. 159-186

Emin Karagözoǧlu, Kerim Keskin and Çaǧrı Saǧlam

Assigning tasks to pairs pp. 187-219

Antonio Nicolò, Pietro Salmaso, Arunava Sen and Sonal Yadav

Axiomatization of the Farsighted Stable Set and the (Strong) Rational Expectations Farsighted Stable Set pp. 221-250

Mert Kimya

Skills and the Regulation of Labor pp. 251-272

Diogo Baerlocher

Asylum Assignment and Burden-Sharing pp. 273-303

Gian Caspari and Manshu Khanna

Intertemporal collective choice and dynamic consistency pp. 305-346

Xiaoxi Li and Xiangyu Qu

Group identity and cooperation in infinitely repeated games pp. 347-387

Bo Chen, Sherry Xin Li and Tracy Xiao Liu

Volume 81, issue 4, 2026

Mean-preserving capacities: A tractable class of Choquet capacities pp. 1009-1039

Richard Peter and Pascal Toquebeuf

The Appeal Decision and Settlement Bargaining pp. 1041-1076

Ansgar Wohlschlegel

Optimal mechanisms with non-quasilinear preferences pp. 1077-1129

James Bergin

Microfinance in the U.S pp. 1131-1173

Fan Liu and Anne Villamil

Talking heads. Public communication policies in an international economy pp. 1175-1227

Hubert Kempf and Olga Kuznetsova

Under-reaction: Irrational behavior or robust response to model misspecification? pp. 1229-1253

Filippo Massari

Identification of smooth ambiguity pp. 1255-1288

Herakles Polemarchakis, Larry Selden and Xinxi Song

A Distributionally Robust Random Utility Model pp. 1289-1330

Emerson Melo, David Müller and Ruben Schlotter

To be or not to be? Central bank independence and economic turmoil pp. 1331-1376

Anastasia Burkovskaya and Sean Gong

Heterogeneous early health signals and deferred annuities pp. 1377-1406

Sau-Him Paul Lau and Qilin Zhang

Communicating in a coordination game with private information pp. 1407-1434

Antonio Cabrales, Michalis Drouvelis, Zeynep Gürgüç and Indrajit Ray

Volume 81, issue 3, 2026

Persuasion without Priors pp. 625-659

Alexei Parakhonyak and Anton Sobolev

Antisocial learning pp. 661-688

James Best

Asymmetric information, asset markets, and the medium of exchange pp. 689-749

Athanasios Geromichalos, Lucas Herrenbrueck and Zijian Wang

Revealed types and beliefs in bayesian games pp. 751-773

Mengke Wang

Strategy-proof aggregation of approximate and imprecise judgments pp. 775-805

Marcello Basili, Ernesto Savaglio and Stefano Vannucci

Sequential team contests: alternating or specializing? pp. 807-834

Stefano Barbieri

Projects with uncertain requirements and deadlines pp. 835-864

Philipp Külpmann

Efficient and strategy-proof multi-unit object allocation problems with money: decreasing incremental valuations with income effects pp. 865-906

Hiroki Shinozaki, Tomoya Kazumura and Shigehiro Serizawa

Learning and stochastic dominance with applications to subjective valuation of options pp. 907-935

Ehud Lehrer and Tao Wang

Choice flexibility and long-run cooperation pp. 937-973

Gabriele Camera, Jaehong Kim and David Rojo Arjona

Are Government Bonds Net Wealth or a Liability —Optimal Debt and Taxes under Uninsurable Income Risk pp. 975-1008

YiLi Chien, Yi Wen and HsinJung Yu

Volume 81, issue 1, 2026

An introduction to the special issue on behavioral game theory pp. 1-11

David J. Cooper, Boon Han Koh and Stefan P. Penczynski

Testing the simplicity of strategy-proof mechanisms pp. 13-42

Alexander L. Brown, Daniel G. Stephenson and Rodrigo A. Velez

Machine games: theory and experimental evidence pp. 43-75

Christos Ioannou

Viable Nash equilibria: an experiment pp. 77-92

Duk Gyoo Kim, Daehong Min and John Wooders

Beyond Hawks and Doves: Can inequality ease coordination? pp. 93-111

Maria Bigoni, Mario Blazquez De Paz and Chloé Le Coq

Selection through information acquisition in coordination games pp. 113-148

Michal Szkup and Isabel Trevino

Level-k thinking in the extensive form pp. 149-189

Burkhard Schipper and Hang Zhou

Buy it now or later, or not: loss aversion in advance purchasing pp. 191-224

Senran Lin

Correlated equilibria and forecasts based on Naïve play in Hawk–Dove games pp. 225-251

Timothy Cason, Tridib Sharma and Radovan Vadovič

Voluntary versus mandatory information disclosure in the sequential prisoner’s dilemma pp. 253-302

Georg Kirchsteiger, Tom Lenaerts and Rémi Suchon

Disclosure of belief–dependent preferences in a trust game pp. 303-340

Giuseppe Attanasi, Pierpaolo Battigalli, Elena Manzoni and Rosemarie Nagel

Social preferences and the variability of conditional cooperation pp. 341-366

Malte Baader, Simon Gächter, Kyeongtae Lee and Martin Sefton

Sorting of trustees: the good and the bad stay in the game pp. 367-389

Eberhard Feess and Florian Kerzenmacher

Moral reference points: theory and experimental evidence pp. 391-427

James C. Cox, John List, Michael Price, Vjollca Sadiraj and Anya Samek

Moral preferences in bargaining pp. 429-452

Pau Juan-Bartroli and Emin Karagözoğlu

Evolution of cooperation in the indefinitely repeated collective action with a contest for power pp. 453-483

Yaroslav Rosokha, Xinxin Lyu, Denis Tverskoi and Sergey Gavrilets

Social aspiration reinforcement learning in Cournot games pp. 485-524

Enrique Fatas, Antonio J. Morales and Ainhoa Jaramillo-Gutiérrez

Delegation with strategic complements and substitutes pp. 525-552

Yadi Yang and Jan Potters

Identity and political corruption: a laboratory experiment pp. 553-576

Maria Cubel, Anastasia Papadopoulou and Santiago Sánchez-Pagés

Bargaining over communal endowments after prior interaction: experimental evidence pp. 577-624

Lian Xue, Stefania Sitzia and Theodore L. Turocy