Economic Theory

1991 - 2023

Current editor(s): Nichoals Yanneils

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Springer
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)
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Volume 76, issue 4, 2023

On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals pp. 1051-1067

Andriy Zapechelnyuk

Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers pp. 1069-1114

Matt Van Essen and John Wooders

Revealed preference tests for price competition in multi-product differentiated markets pp. 1115-1144

Yuta Yasui

When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? pp. 1145-1173

Battal Doğan and M. Bumin Yenmez

Computing revealed preference goodness-of-fit measures with integer programming pp. 1175-1195

Thomas Demuynck and John Rehbeck

Financial maintenance covenants in bank loans pp. 1197-1255

Redouane Elkamhi, Latchezar Popov and Raunaq S. Pungaliya

Behavioral strong implementation pp. 1257-1287

T. Hayashi, R. Jain, V. Korpela and M. Lombardi

Cooperative teaching and learning of actions pp. 1289-1327

Yangbo Song and Mofei Zhao

I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions pp. 1329-1362

Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Yevgeny Tsodikovich and Yannick Viossat

Influential news and policy-making pp. 1363-1418

Federico Vaccari

Volume 76, issue 3, 2023

Subjective expected utility through stochastic independence pp. 723-757

Michel Grabisch, Benjamin Monet and Vassili Vergopoulos

When do more police induce more crime? pp. 759-778

Casilda Lasso de la Vega, Oscar Volij and Federico Weinschelbaum

The core for housing markets with limited externalities pp. 779-811

Bettina Klaus and Claudia Meo

Empirical content of classic assignment methods: jungle and market economy pp. 813-825

Geoffroy Clippel and Kareen Rozen

R&D subsidies, income taxes, and growth through cycles pp. 827-866

Jing Wan and Jie Zhang

Innovate to lead or innovate to prevail: When do monopolistic rents induce growth? pp. 867-919

Roberto Piazza and Yu Zheng

Asset bubbles and frictional intermediation pp. 921-961

Chenxi Wang

Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core pp. 963-994

David Pérez-Castrillo and Marilda Sotomayor

A theory of National Development Bank: long-term investment and the agency problem pp. 995-1024

Shenzhe Jiang, Junjie Xia, Jiajun Xu and Jianye Yan

Guilt moderation pp. 1025-1050

Paul H. Y. Cheung

Volume 76, issue 2, 2023

The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems pp. 375-416

Rongzhu Ke and Xinyi Xu

Multiple tastes and beliefs with an infinite prize space pp. 417-444

Kazuhiro Hara and Gil Riella

On optimal extinction in the matchbox two-sector model pp. 445-494

Liuchun Deng, Minako Fujio and M. Khan

Optimal income taxation under monopolistic competition pp. 495-523

Alexander Tarasov and Robertas Zubrickas

Expected utility in Savage’s framework without the completeness axiom pp. 525-550

Dino Borie

Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms pp. 551-584

Julien Combe

Individual choice under social influence pp. 585-606

Yusufcan Demirkan and Boyao Li

The dynamics of Pareto distributed wealth in a small open economy pp. 607-644

Matthias Birkner, Niklas Scheuer and Klaus Wälde

Informational correlation and selective disclosure pp. 645-683

Qiang Gong, Jie Shuai and Huanxing Yang

Evolutionary robustness of dominant strategy implementation pp. 685-721

Sarvesh Bandhu and Ratul Lahkar

Volume 76, issue 1, 2023

Rather doomed than uncertain: risk attitudes and transmissive behavior under asymptomatic infection pp. 1-44

Konstantin Matthies and Flavio Toxvaerd

The Walrasian objection mechanism and Mas-Colell’s bargaining set in economies with many commodities pp. 45-68

Niccolò Urbinati

Haircuts, interest rates, and credit cycles pp. 69-109

Zehao Liu and Chengbo Xie

The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules pp. 111-152

Madhuparna Karmokar and Souvik Roy

A competitive search approach to exchange rate pass-through pp. 153-201

Ayman Mnasri and Beverly Lapham

Income inequality, productivity, and international trade pp. 203-249

Wen-Tai Hsu, Lin Lu and Pierre Picard

Dynamics of diffusion on monoplex and multiplex networks: a message-passing approach pp. 251-287

Teruyoshi Kobayashi and Tomokatsu Onaga

On wastefulness of random assignments in discrete allocation problems pp. 289-310

Jun Zhang

Stochastic growth, conservation of capital and convergence to a positive steady state pp. 311-351

Tapan Mitra and Santanu Roy

An ordinal theorem of the maximum pp. 353-373

Marek Weretka

Volume 75, issue 4, 2023

Source and rank-dependent utility pp. 949-981

Mohammed Abdellaoui and Horst Zank

Equilibrium existence and expected payoffs in all-pay auctions with constraints pp. 983-1007

Ivan Pastine and Tuvana Pastine

Randomizing without randomness pp. 1009-1037

Paolo Ghirardato and Daniele Pennesi

Bequests or education pp. 1039-1069

Julio Dávila

Choquet expected discounted utility pp. 1071-1098

Lorenzo Bastianello and José Heleno Faro

Thresholds, critical levels, and generalized sufficientarian principles pp. 1099-1139

Walter Bossert, Susumu Cato and Kohei Kamaga

Optimal design for redistributions among endogenous buyers and sellers pp. 1141-1180

Mingshi Kang and Charles Z. Zheng

Corporate self-regulation of imperfect competition pp. 1181-1205

Hervé Crès and Mich Tvede

Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed pp. 1207-1245

Xiaogang Che and Tilman Klumpp

Measuring well-being and lives worth living pp. 1247-1266

Marc Fleurbaey and Gregory Ponthiere

Volume 75, issue 3, 2023

Complete markets with bankruptcy risk and pecuniary default punishments pp. 625-640

V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha and Rafael Mouallem Rosa

General equilibrium methodology applied to the design, implementation and performance evaluation of large, multi-market and multi-unit policy constrained auctions pp. 641-693

Charles R. Plott, Timothy Cason, Benjamin J. Gillen, Hsingyang Lee and Travis Maron

On the observable restrictions of limited consideration models: theory and application pp. 695-715

Yuta Inoue and Koji Shirai

An algebraic approach to revealed preference pp. 717-742

Mikhail Freer and Cesar Martinelli

Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations pp. 743-780

Anastasia Antsygina and Mariya Teteryatnikova

Forgetful updating and stubborn decision-makers pp. 781-802

Tai-Wei Hu

Poisson–Cournot games pp. 803-840

Francesco Sinopoli, Christopher Künstler, Claudia Meroni and Carlos Pimienta

The interaction of emotions and cost-shifting rules in civil litigation pp. 841-885

Ben Chen and José A. Rodrigues-Neto

Cautious stochastic choice, optimal stopping and deliberate randomization pp. 887-922

Vicky Henderson, David Hobson and Matthew Zeng

Greater search cost reduces prices pp. 923-947

Sander Heinsalu

Volume 75, issue 2, 2023

Random dual expected utility pp. 293-315

Wei Ma

Collateral constraints, tranching, and price bases pp. 317-340

Feixue Gong and Gregory Phelan

Flying or trapped? pp. 341-388

Yunfang Hu, Takuma Kunieda, Kazuo Nishimura and Ping Wang

A note on payments in the lab for infinite horizon dynamic games with discounting pp. 389-426

Arun Gautham Chandrasekhar and Juan Pablo Xandri

Dynamic bargaining with voluntary participation and externalities pp. 427-452

Akira Okada

Cryptocurrency and double spending history: transactions with zero confirmation pp. 453-491

Kee-Youn Kang

Information structures and information aggregation in threshold equilibria in elections pp. 493-522

Svetlana Kosterina

Welfare-improving misreported polls pp. 523-565

Felipe R. Durazzo and David Turchick

Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities pp. 567-590

Boaz Zik

Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets pp. 591-623

Antonio Romero-Medina and Matteo Triossi

Volume 75, issue 1, 2023

Asset market equilibrium under rational inattention pp. 1-30

Jianjun Miao and Dongling Su

Continuity of marketable payoffs with re-trading pp. 31-53

Jean-Marc Bonnisseau and Achis Chéry

Optimal monetary policy in a collateralized economy pp. 55-89

Gary Gorton and Ping He

Revealed stochastic choice with attributes pp. 91-112

Roy Allen and John Rehbeck

Ranking and search effort in matching pp. 113-136

Joonbae Lee and Hanna Wang

A theory of reference point formation pp. 137-166

Özgür Kıbrıs, Yusufcan Masatlioglu and Elchin Suleymanov

Complementarity and information in collective action pp. 167-206

Stefano Barbieri

Updating variational (Bewley) preferences pp. 207-228

José Heleno Faro and Ana Santos

Axiomatic analysis of liability problems with rooted-tree networks in tort law pp. 229-258

Takayuki Oishi, Gerard van der Laan and René van den Brink

Prize formation and sharing in multi-stage contests pp. 259-289

Vladimir Petkov

Correction to: Asset pricing under smooth ambiguity in continuous time pp. 291-292

Lars Peter Hansen and Jianjun Miao