Economic Theory

1991 - 2026

Current editor(s): Nichoals Yanneils

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Springer
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)
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Volume 81, issue 1, 2026

An introduction to the special issue on behavioral game theory pp. 1-11

David J. Cooper, Boon Han Koh and Stefan P. Penczynski

Testing the simplicity of strategy-proof mechanisms pp. 13-42

Alexander L. Brown, Daniel G. Stephenson and Rodrigo A. Velez

Machine games: theory and experimental evidence pp. 43-75

Christos A. Ioannou

Viable Nash equilibria: an experiment pp. 77-92

Duk Gyoo Kim, Daehong Min and John Wooders

Beyond Hawks and Doves: Can inequality ease coordination? pp. 93-111

Maria Bigoni, Mario Blazquez De Paz and Chloé Le Coq

Selection through information acquisition in coordination games pp. 113-148

Michal Szkup and Isabel Trevino

Level-k thinking in the extensive form pp. 149-189

Burkhard C. Schipper and Hang Zhou

Buy it now or later, or not: loss aversion in advance purchasing pp. 191-224

Senran Lin

Correlated equilibria and forecasts based on Naïve play in Hawk–Dove games pp. 225-251

Timothy N. Cason, Tridib Sharma and Radovan Vadovič

Voluntary versus mandatory information disclosure in the sequential prisoner’s dilemma pp. 253-302

Georg Kirchsteiger, Tom Lenaerts and Rémi Suchon

Disclosure of belief–dependent preferences in a trust game pp. 303-340

Giuseppe Attanasi, Pierpaolo Battigalli, Elena Manzoni and Rosemarie Nagel

Social preferences and the variability of conditional cooperation pp. 341-366

Malte Baader, Simon Gächter, Kyeongtae Lee and Martin Sefton

Sorting of trustees: the good and the bad stay in the game pp. 367-389

Eberhard Feess and Florian Kerzenmacher

Moral reference points: theory and experimental evidence pp. 391-427

James C. Cox, John List, Michael Price, Vjollca Sadiraj and Anya Samek

Moral preferences in bargaining pp. 429-452

Pau Juan-Bartroli and Emin Karagözoğlu

Evolution of cooperation in the indefinitely repeated collective action with a contest for power pp. 453-483

Yaroslav Rosokha, Xinxin Lyu, Denis Tverskoi and Sergey Gavrilets

Social aspiration reinforcement learning in Cournot games pp. 485-524

Enrique Fatas, Antonio J. Morales and Ainhoa Jaramillo-Gutiérrez

Delegation with strategic complements and substitutes pp. 525-552

Yadi Yang and Jan Potters

Identity and political corruption: a laboratory experiment pp. 553-576

Maria Cubel, Anastasia Papadopoulou and Santiago Sánchez-Pagés

Bargaining over communal endowments after prior interaction: experimental evidence pp. 577-624

Lian Xue, Stefania Sitzia and Theodore L. Turocy

Volume 80, issue 4, 2025

The generality of the strong axiom pp. 965-988

Cristián Ugarte

Restoring the commons: optimizing the restoration of natural assets pp. 989-1039

Jarmo Jääskeläinen and Pauli Lappi

Equilibrium land use in a linear city with a central shopping district pp. 1041-1084

Liliana Garrido-da-Silva, Joao Correia-da-Silva and Sofia B. S. D. Castro

Heterogeneity of ex post fairness and ex ante fairness pp. 1085-1118

Seiji Takanashi

Sequential screening with unknown mean and spread pp. 1119-1175

Daniel Danau and Annalisa Vinella

Coordination through Committees and Markets with Option Timing Games pp. 1177-1201

Laura Delaney and Tarik Driouchi

Restricted dynamic consistency pp. 1203-1231

Lorenzo Stanca

Full surplus extraction and consideration sets pp. 1233-1265

Nicolas Pastrian

Are the players in an interactive belief model meta-certain of the model itself? pp. 1267-1295

Satoshi Fukuda

Compatibility between stability and strategy-proofness: A single-peaked preferences investigation pp. 1297-1327

Pinaki Mandal

Volume 80, issue 3, 2025

Existence of the weak and strong core in a sharing model with arbitrary graph structures pp. 659-683

Jay Sethuraman and Sonal Yadav

An exchangeability-based finite-state axiomatization of subjective probability pp. 685-702

Soo Hong Chew, Jacob S. Sagi and Wenqian Wang

Cross-ownership in duopoly: Are there any incentives to divest? pp. 703-744

Rupayan Pal and Emmanuel Petrakis

The perils of a coherent narrative pp. 745-759

Alessandro Ispano

Equilibrium existence in Krugman’s and Bertoletti–Etro’s trade models: the general case pp. 761-800

Fedor Slepov and Sergey Kokovin

Trade-offs in choosing a college major pp. 801-826

Michael Kaganovich

Dynamic coordination in efficient and fair outcomes: a developmental perspective pp. 827-861

Isabelle Brocas and Juan D. Carrillo

Optimal contracts when the players think differently pp. 863-890

Martin Dumav, Urmee Khan and Luca Rigotti

Search and multiple jobholding pp. 891-939

Etienne Lalé

Deflationary traps, agents’ beliefs and fiscal–monetary policies pp. 941-964

Paul Grauwe and Pasquale Foresti

Volume 80, issue 2, 2025

Introduction to the Special Issue in Honor of David K. Levine pp. 417-420

Cesar Martinelli

Sophisticated reasoning, learning, and equilibrium in repeated games with imperfect feedback pp. 421-464

Pierpaolo Battigalli and Davide Bordoli

On the limit points of an infinitely repeated rational expectations equilibrium pp. 465-492

Marialaura Pesce, Niccolò Urbinati and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Uniformly strict equilibrium for repeated games with private monitoring and communication pp. 493-514

Richard McLean, Ichiro Obara and Andrew Postlewaite

Risk loving and fat tails in the wealth distribution pp. 515-540

Aloisio Araujo, Juan Gama and Timothy Kehoe

On the convergence criterion in three-period lived overlapping generations models pp. 541-563

Jean-Paul Barinci, Hye-Jin Cho and Jean-Pierre Drugeon

Buying elections for peanuts pp. 565-593

Gerard Domènech-Gironell and Dimitrios Xefteris

Transfers in climate action teams pp. 595-618

Suzi Kerr, Steffen Lippert and Edmund Y. Lou

Feudal political economy pp. 619-658

Desiree Desierto and Mark Koyama

Volume 80, issue 1, 2025

Rationally misplaced confidence pp. 1-38

Derek Lemoine

Exploring infinite population utilitarianism under strong anonymity pp. 39-85

Geir Asheim, Kohei Kamaga and Stéphane Zuber

Incentives and peer effects in the workplace: On the impact of envy and wage transparency on organizational design pp. 87-124

Jenny Kragl, Benjamin Bental and Peymaneh Safaynikoo

Economy-wide consequences of credit subsidies to targeted firms pp. 125-169

Gabriel Madeira, Mailliw Serafim, Sergio Mikio Koyama and Fernando Kuwer

Rationalizable learning pp. 171-202

Andrew Caplin, Daniel Martin and Philip Marx

The role of risky debt and safe assets in unregulated financial intermediaries with costly state verification pp. 203-239

Francesco Carli and Pedro Gomis-Porqueras

Income disaster model with optimal consumption pp. 241-320

Seyoung Park

Egalitarian random assignment pp. 321-354

Conal Duddy

Not obviously manipulable allotment rules pp. 355-380

R. Pablo Arribillaga and Agustín Bonifacio

Plague and prejudice: disease, discrimination, and social exclusion pp. 381-415

Javier Birchenall