Compatibility between stability and strategy-proofness: A single-peaked preferences investigation

Pinaki Mandal ()
Additional contact information
Pinaki Mandal: Arizona State University

Economic Theory, 2025, vol. 80, issue 4, No 10, 1297-1327

Abstract: Abstract In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents’ preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents’ preferences have specific restricted structures? Such scenarios frequently arise in real-world applications. This study explores the possibility of achieving both stability and strategy-proofness by focusing on scenarios where agents’ preferences follow a structured pattern called single-peakedness. We focus on the simplest case – the well-known marriage problem, which is a one-to-one matching market. Despite its simplicity, this model is a useful starting point for exploration in many cases. Our main contribution is identifying all single-peaked subdomains on which stability and (weak/strong group) strategy-proofness are compatible, which we present through two key results. The first one characterizes all single-peaked subdomains with stable and (weakly group) strategy-proof matching rules, and identifies such a matching rule on these domains. The second one is an impossibility result that shows the incompatibility between stability and strong group strategy-proofness on single-peaked subdomains.

Keywords: Two-sided matching; Single-peaked preferences; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Non-bossiness; C78; D47; D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00199-025-01660-6 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:80:y:2025:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-025-01660-6

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-025-01660-6

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils

More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().