Economic Theory

1991 - 2025

Current editor(s): Nichoals Yanneils

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Springer
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)
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Dynamic choice with constant source-dependent relative risk aversion pp. 393-422: Costis Skiadas
Efficiency may improve when defectors exist pp. 423-460: Takako Fujiwara-Greve, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Nobue Suzuki
Core and coalitional fairness: the case of information sharing rules pp. 461-494: Anuj Bhowmik
For claims problems, compromising between the proportional and constrained equal awards rules pp. 495-520: William Thomson
Optimal health investment and preference structure pp. 521-565: Théophile Azomahou, Bity Diene, Mbaye Diene and Luc Soete
Imitation in Cournot oligopolies with multiple markets pp. 567-587: Jonas Hedlund

Learning and market clearing: theory and experiments pp. 203-241: Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Georg Kirchsteiger
On the properties of an emission-generating technology and its parametric representation pp. 243-282: Sushama Murty
An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes pp. 283-313: Jean-François Caulier, Michel Grabisch and Agnieszka Rusinowska
Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues pp. 315-343: Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Ines Macho-Stadler, David Perez-Castrillo and Licun Xue
Fearing the worst: the importance of uncertainty for inequality pp. 345-370: Keith Blackburn and David Chivers
Piecewise additivity for non-expected utility pp. 371-392: Craig Webb

Efficient outcomes in repeated games with limited monitoring pp. 1-34: Mihaela Schaar, Yuanzhang Xiao and William Zame
Martingale properties of self-enforcing debt pp. 35-57: Florin Bidian and Camelia Bejan
Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests pp. 59-71: Christian Ewerhart
Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships pp. 73-121: Ayça Kaya and Galina Vereshchagina
Two simple variations of top trading cycles pp. 123-140: Thayer Morrill
Rational housing bubble pp. 141-201: Bo Zhao

Monetary equilibria and Knightian uncertainty pp. 435-459: Eisei Ohtaki and Hiroyuki Ozaki
Household formation and markets pp. 461-507: Hans Gersbach, Hans Haller and Hideo Konishi
Two-period economies with price-contingent deliveries pp. 509-525: Joao Correia-da-Silva
International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight pp. 527-546: Effrosyni Diamantoudi and Eftichios Sartzetakis
Investor protection and optimal contracts under risk aversion and costly state verification pp. 547-577: Cesar Tamayo
Collateral and the efficiency of monetary policy pp. 579-603: Udara Peiris and Alexandros Vardoulakis
Efficient dark markets pp. 605-624: Romans Pancs

Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction pp. 245-275: Bernard Lebrun
Further results on essential Nash equilibria in normal-form games pp. 277-300: Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau
Dynamic network formation with incomplete information pp. 301-331: Yangbo Song and Mihaela Schaar
Procedural fairness and redistributive proportional tax pp. 333-354: P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Arkadi Predtetchinski
Monetary transaction costs and the term premium pp. 355-375: Raphael Espinoza and Dimitrios Tsomocos
Long-run technology choice with endogenous local capacity pp. 377-399: Fei Shi
Leapfrogging cycles in international competition pp. 401-433: Yuichi Furukawa

The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities pp. 1-19: Bettina Klose and Dan Kovenock
A model of belief influence in large social networks pp. 21-59: Antonio Jimenez-Martinez
Euler–Lagrange equations of stochastic differential games: application to a game of a productive asset pp. 61-108: Ricardo Josa-Fombellida and Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero
Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games pp. 109-146: Gordon Rausser, Leo Simon and Jinhua Zhao
Value allocation under ambiguity pp. 147-167: Angelos Angelopoulos and Leonidas Koutsougeras
Revealed preference theory for finite choice sets pp. 169-200: Sam Cosaert and Thomas Demuynck
Differential information in large games with strategic complementarities pp. 201-243: Łukasz Balbus, Pawel Dziewulski, Kevin Reffett and Łukasz Woźny

Nash bargaining for log-convex problems pp. 413-440: Cheng-Zhong Qin, Shuzhong Shi and Guofu Tan
Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma pp. 441-484: Caleb Cox, Matthew Jones, Kevin Pflum and Paul Healy
A Folk theorem for stochastic games with finite horizon pp. 485-507: Chantal Marlats
A dynamic model of certification and reputation pp. 509-541: Mihaela Schaar and Simpson Zhang
Information transmission in nested sender–receiver games pp. 543-569: Ying Chen and Sidartha Gordon
On the representation of incomplete preferences under uncertainty with indecisiveness in tastes and beliefs pp. 571-600: Gil Riella

General equilibrium, preferences and financial institutions after the crisis pp. 217-254: Aloisio Araujo
Purification and roulette wheels pp. 255-272: Michael Greinecker and Konrad Podczeck
Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs pp. 273-303: Francis Bloch, Simona Fabrizi and Steffen Lippert
Incentive contracts under product market competition and R&D spillovers pp. 305-328: Evangelia Chalioti
On existence and bubbles of Ramsey equilibrium with borrowing constraints pp. 329-353: Robert Becker, Stefano Bosi, Cuong Van and Thomas Seegmuller
Monitoring, moral hazard, and turnover pp. 355-374: Jacek Rothert
Bayesian general equilibrium pp. 375-411: Alexis Akira Toda

The effects of credit subsidies on development pp. 1-30: António Antunes, Tiago Cavalcanti and Anne Villamil
Robust stochastic stability pp. 31-57: Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Nick Netzer
Decision making in phantom spaces pp. 59-98: Yehuda Izhakian and Zur Izhakian
The Average Tree permission value for games with a permission tree pp. 99-123: Rene van den Brink, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Gerard Laan and Adolphus Talman
Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction pp. 125-160: Helmuts Azacis and Péter Vida
Pure-strategy Nash equilibria in nonatomic games with infinite-dimensional action spaces pp. 161-182: Xiang Sun and Yongchao Zhang
Waging simple wars: a complete characterization of two-battlefield Blotto equilibria pp. 183-216: Scott Macdonell and Nick Mastronardi