Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games

Philip Reny ()

Economic Theory, 2016, vol. 61, issue 3, No 8, 553-569

Abstract: Abstract We provide several generalizations of the various equilibrium existence results in Reny (Econometrica 67:1029–1056, 1999), Barelli and Meneghel (Econometrica 81:813–824, 2013), and McLennan et al. (Econometrica 79:1643–1664, 2011). We also provide an example demonstrating that a natural additional generalization is not possible. All of the theorems yielding existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria here are stated in terms of the players’ preference relations over joint strategies. Hence, in contrast to much of the previous work in the area, the present results for pure-strategy equilibria are entirely ordinal.

Keywords: Discontinuous games; Point security; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (44)

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Journal Article: Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games (2020)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-015-0934-3

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