Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games

Philip Reny ()

Annual Review of Economics, 2020, vol. 12, issue 1, 439-470

Abstract: We review the discontinuous games literature, with a sharp focus on conditions that ensure the existence of pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria in strategic form games and of Bayes-Nash equilibria in Bayesian games.

Date: 2020
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Journal Article: Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games (2016)
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DOI: 10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-111720

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