Economic Theory

1991 - 2025

Current editor(s): Nichoals Yanneils

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Springer
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)
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Volume 73, issue 4, 2022

Discontinuous stochastic games pp. 827-858

Wei He

Minimal rationalizations pp. 859-879

Igor Kopylov

Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences pp. 881-916

Bettina Klose and Paul Schweinzer

Robust contracting in general contract spaces pp. 917-945

Julio Backhoff-Veraguas, Patrick Beissner and Ulrich Horst

Equality and responsibility: ex ante and ex post redistribution mechanisms pp. 947-975

Kristof Bosmans and Z. Emel Öztürk

Generic determinacy among stationary overlapping generations pp. 977-993

Jonathan L. Burke

An epistemic characterization of MACA pp. 995-1024

Xiao Luo and Ben Wang

Equilibrium efficiency with secured and unsecured assets pp. 1025-1049

Aloisio Araujo and J. Mauricio Villalba

The median rule in judgement aggregation pp. 1051-1100

Klaus Nehring and Marcus Pivato

Shareholder heterogeneity, asymmetric information, and the equilibrium manager pp. 1101-1134

Milo Bianchi, Rose-Anne Dana and Elyès Jouini

Order-k rationality pp. 1135-1153

Salvador Barberà, Geoffroy de Clippel, Alejandro Neme and Kareen Rozen

Volume 73, issue 2, 2022

Special Issue in honor of Nicholas C. Yannelis – Part II pp. 377-385

Rabah Amir, Bernard Cornet, M. Khan, David Levine and Edward Prescott

Walrasian equilibrium theory with and without free-disposal: theorems and counterexamples in an infinite-agent context pp. 387-412

Robert M. Anderson, Haosui Duanmu, M. Khan and Metin Uyanık

Existence of Walrasian equilibria with discontinuous, non-ordered, interdependent and price-dependent preferences, without free disposal, and without compact consumption sets pp. 413-420

Konrad Podczeck and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Revisiting the Coase theorem pp. 421-438

Carlos Hervés-Beloso and Emma Moreno-García

Coalitions with limited coordination pp. 439-456

Leonidas C. Koutsougeras

Financial intermediation and the welfare theorems in incomplete markets pp. 457-486

Marc Oliver Bettzüge, Thorsten Hens and Michael Zierhut

Social loss with respect to the core of an economy with externalities pp. 487-508

Christian Pietro, Maria Graziano and Vincenzo Platino

Funding employer-based insurance: regressive taxation and premium exclusions pp. 509-540

Zhigang Feng and Anne Villamil

Constructing pure-exchange economies with many equilibria pp. 541-564

Pascal Gauthier, Timothy Kehoe and Erwan Quintin

Incentive compatibility under ambiguity pp. 565-593

Huiyi Guo and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Success in contests pp. 595-624

David K. Levine and Andrea Mattozzi

On nondegenerate equilibria of double auctions with several buyers and a price floor pp. 625-654

Pavlo Prokopovych and Nicholas C. Yannelis

An evolutionary finance model with short selling and endogenous asset supply pp. 655-677

Rabah Amir, Sergei Belkov, Igor V. Evstigneev and Thorsten Hens

Approximation and characterization of Nash equilibria of large games pp. 679-694

Guilherme Carmona and Konrad Podczeck

Individual upper semicontinuity and subgame perfect $$\epsilon $$ ϵ -equilibria in games with almost perfect information pp. 695-719

János Flesch, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Jasmine Maes and Arkadi Predtetchinski

Submodular financial markets with frictions pp. 721-744

Alain Chateauneuf and Bernard Cornet

Correction to: Submodular financial markets with frictions pp. 745-746

Alain Chateauneuf and Bernard Cornet

Static and dynamic quantile preferences pp. 747-779

Luciano Castro and Antonio Galvao

A necessary optimality condition in two-dimensional screening pp. 781-806

Aloisio Araujo, Sergei Vieira and Braulio Calagua

Binary strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference pp. 807-826

Achille Basile, Surekha Rao and K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao

Volume 73, issue 1, 2022

An incentive efficient market for mechanisms in large Akerlof economies pp. 1-54

Alex Citanna and Paolo Siconolfi

Propensity to consume and the optimality of Ramsey–Euler policies pp. 55-89

Tapan Mitra and Santanu Roy

Strong robustness to incomplete information and the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium pp. 91-119

Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko and David Lagziel

A model of state aggregation pp. 121-149

Anastasia Burkovskaya

Robust experimentation in the continuous time bandit problem pp. 151-181

Farzad Pourbabaee

Economic geography meets Hotelling: the home-sweet-home effect pp. 183-209

Sofia B. S. D. Castro, Joao Correia-da-Silva and José Gaspar

Public employment and economic growth pp. 211-236

Diogo Baerlocher

Efficiency, equity, and social rationality under uncertainty pp. 237-255

Kaname Miyagishima

Management cycles pp. 257-300

Shingo Ishiguro

Implications of multilateral tariff bindings on the extent of preferential trade agreement formation pp. 301-347

Moise Nken and Halis Yildiz

A not so myopic axiomatization of discounting pp. 349-376

Jean-Pierre Drugeon and Thai Ha-Huy

Volume 72, issue 4, 2021

Dynamic coordination via organizational routines pp. 1001-1047

Andreas Blume, April Mitchell Franco and Paul Heidhues

Reputation and the “need for enemies” pp. 1049-1089

Maxime Menuet and Patrick Villieu

Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles pp. 1091-1120

Paul H. Edelman and John Weymark

Growth and welfare effects of intellectual property rights when consumers differ in income pp. 1121-1170

Christian Kiedaisch

Tempting goods, self-control fatigue, and time preference in consumer dynamics pp. 1171-1216

Shinsuke Ikeda and Takeshi Ojima

Competitive equilibria in a comonotone market pp. 1217-1255

Tim J. Boonen, Fangda Liu and Ruodu Wang

On Markovian collective choice with heterogeneous quasi-hyperbolic discounting pp. 1257-1296

Jean-Pierre Drugeon and Bertrand Wigniolle

Prices versus auctions in large markets pp. 1297-1337

Hanzhe Zhang

How to choose a fair delegation? pp. 1339-1373

Burak Can, Péter Csóka and Emre Ergin

Discrete Arrow–Pratt indexes for risk and uncertainty pp. 1375-1393

Aurelien Baillon and Olivier L’Haridon

Volume 72, issue 3, 2021

Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues pp. 701-704

Emir Kamenica, Kyungmin Kim and Andriy Zapechelnyuk

Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade? pp. 705-721

Jacopo Bizzotto and Adrien Vigier

Resisting persuasion pp. 723-742

Elias Tsakas, Nikolas Tsakas and Dimitrios Xefteris

Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment pp. 743-764

Daehong Min

Correction to: Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment pp. 765-765

Daehong Min

Competitive disclosure of correlated information pp. 767-799

Pak Hung Au and Keiichi Kawai

Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald’s maxmin preferences pp. 801-833

Zhiwei Liu and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Information transmission and voting pp. 835-868

Yingni Guo

Persuasion with costly precision pp. 869-908

Arianna Degan and Ming Li

Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver pp. 909-953

Ju Hu and Xi Weng

Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms pp. 955-1000

Maxim Ivanov

Volume 72, issue 2, 2021

Iterated dominance revisited pp. 377-421

Amanda Friedenberg and H. Jerome Keisler

How stationarity contradicts intergenerational equity pp. 423-444

Geir Asheim, Kuntal Banerjee and Tapan Mitra

On defining ex ante payoffs in games with diffuse prior pp. 445-472

Attila Ambrus and Aaron Kolb

Two-sided heterogeneity, endogenous sharing, and international matching markets pp. 473-509

Jaerim Choi

Ranking by weighted sum pp. 511-532

Tapan Mitra and Kemal Ozbek

Reaching across the aisle to block reforms pp. 533-578

Valerio Dotti

Adverse selection, efficiency and the structure of information pp. 579-614

Heski Bar-Isaac, Ian Jewitt and Clare Leaver

Eventual periodicity in the two-sector RSL model: equilibrium vis-à-vis optimum growth pp. 615-639

Liuchun Deng, Minako Fujio and M. Khan

Stochastic expected utility for binary choice: a ‘modular’ axiomatic foundation pp. 641-669

Matthew Ryan

Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals pp. 671-700

Sambuddha Ghosh, Yan Long and Manipushpak Mitra

Volume 72, issue 1, 2021

Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants pp. 1-19

Eun Jeong Heo, Sunghoon Hong and Youngsub Chun

Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations pp. 21-48

Marco Faravelli and Priscilla Man

Language and coordination games pp. 49-92

Melody Lo

Nominal exchange rate determination and dynamics in an OLG framework pp. 93-132

Mauro Bambi and Sara Eugeni

Price probabilities: a class of Bayesian and non-Bayesian prediction rules pp. 133-166

Filippo Massari

Individual sense of justice and Harsanyi’s impartial observer pp. 167-199

Abhinash Borah

A Model of Secular Migration from Centralized to Decentralized Trade pp. 201-244

Zhifeng Cai and Feng Dong

An axiomatic foundation of conditional logit pp. 245-261

Yves Breitmoser

Climate policy: How to deal with ambiguity? pp. 263-301

Johanna Etner, Meglena Jeleva and Natacha Raffin

Stag Hunt with unknown outside options pp. 303-335

Artyom Jelnov, Yair Tauman and Chang Zhao

The competitive and welfare effects of long-term contracts with network externalities and bounded rationality pp. 337-375

Dawen Meng and Guoqiang Tian