Approximation and characterization of Nash equilibria of large games
Guilherme Carmona and
Konrad Podczeck ()
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Konrad Podczeck: Universität Wien
Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 73, issue 2, No 14, 679-694
Abstract:
Abstract We characterize Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players in terms of approximate equilibria of large finite games. This characterization precisely describes the relationship between the equilibrium sets of the two classes of games. In particular, it yields several approximation results for Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players, which roughly state that all finite-player games that are sufficiently close to a given game with a continuum of players have approximate equilibria that are close to a given Nash equilibrium of the non-atomic game.
Keywords: Nash equilibrium; Non-atomic games; Large games; Approximation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01314-9
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