On convexity in cooperative games with externalities

J. M. Alonso-Meijide, Mikel Álvarez-Mozos, M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro and A. Jiménez-Losada
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J. M. Alonso-Meijide: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro: Universidade de Vigo
A. Jiménez-Losada: Universidad de Sevilla

Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 74, issue 1, No 9, 265-292

Abstract: Abstract We introduce new notions of superadditivity and convexity for games with coalitional externalities. We show parallel results to the classic ones for transferable utility games without externalities. In superadditive games the grand coalition is the most efficient organization of agents. The convexity of a game is equivalent to having non decreasing contributions to larger embedded coalitions. We also see that convex games can only have negative externalities.

Keywords: Externalities; Superadditivity; Convexity; Contribution; Partition function; Lattice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01371-8

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