Economic Theory

1991 - 2025

Current editor(s): Nichoals Yanneils

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Springer
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)
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Capital accumulation and real exchange rate behavior in a small open economy with credit market frictions pp. 461-488: Elisabeth Huybens and Gaetano Antinolfi
Unemployment, credit rationing, and capital accumulation: a tale of two frictions pp. 489-517: Caroline Betts and Joydeep Bhattacharya
The evolution of debt and equity markets in economic development pp. 519-560: Bruce D. Smith and John H. Boyd
Executive compensation: a calibration approach pp. 561-581: Ivilina Popova and Joseph G. Haubrich
Agency costs and business cycles pp. 583-597: Timothy Fuerst and Charles Carlstrom
Asymmetric information, financial intermediation, and business cycles pp. 599-620: Kwanghee Nam and Thomas Cooley
Aggregate fluctuations, financial constraints and risk sharing pp. 621-648: Pamela Labadie
Asset price volatility in a nonconvex general equilibrium model pp. 649-665: Costas Azariadis and Shankha Chakraborty

Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices pp. 227-258: Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Charles Kahn
Unawareness and bankruptcy: A general equilibrium model pp. 259-292: Salvatore Modica, Jean-Marc Tallon and Aldo Rustichini
Recursive utility and preferences for information pp. 293-312: Costis Skiadas
Condorcet cycles in bipartite populations pp. 313-334: Hervé Crès and Yves Balasko
The role of diminishing returns in neo-Schumpeterian growth theory pp. 335-347: Cindy Houser
A model with endogenously determined cycles, discounting and growth pp. 349-369: Jean-Pierre Drugeon
Sequential decisions with several agents pp. 371-391: Marco Scarsini and Bruno Bassan
The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design pp. 393-421: Steven R. Williams and Georgia Kosmopoulou
Efficiency, monotonicity and rationality in public goods economies pp. 423-432: Miguel Gines-Vilar and Francisco Marhuenda
Sequential equilibria of asymmetric ascending auctions: The case of log-normal distributions pp. 433-440: Robert Wilson
Axiomatic characterizations of the Choquet integral pp. 441-448: Ebbe Groes, Hans JÛrgen Jacobsen, Birgitte Sloth and Torben TranÖs

Sealed bid auctions with uncertainty averse bidders pp. 1-20: Kin Chung Lo
General equilibrium, markets, macroeconomics and money in a laboratory experimental environment pp. 21-75: Peng Lian and Charles Plott
The measurement of income mobility: A partial ordering approach pp. 77-102: Tapan Mitra and Efe Ok
Uniqueness of asset prices in an exchange economy with unbounded utility pp. 103-122: Takashi Kamihigashi
General equilibrium, markets, macroeconomics and money in a laboratory experimental environment pp. 123-146: Peng Lian and Charles Plott
Quasitransitive social preference: why some very large coalitions have very little power pp. 147-162: Jerry S. Kelly and Donald E. Campbell
A unified treatment of finite and infinite economies: limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of equilibrium and the core pp. 163-176: Graciela Chichilnisky and Geoffrey Heal
Characterizing C2 aggregate excess demand functions pp. 177-188: Kam-Chau Wong
Serial cost sharing of excludable public goods: general cost functions pp. 189-198: James Dearden
Elastic demand, sunk costs and the Kreps-Scheinkman extension of the Cournot model pp. 199-212: Paul Madden
A note on the "size" of determinacy and indeterminacy pp. 213-223: Julio Dávila

Pareto improving financial innovation in incomplete markets pp. 467-494: David Cass and Alessandro Citanna
Constrained suboptimality in incomplete markets: a general approach and two applications pp. 495-521: Atsushi Kajii, Antonio Villanacci and Alessandro Citanna
Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler's M-form firm pp. 523-543: Tatsuro Ichiishi and Murat R. Sertel
The optimality of nominal contracts pp. 545-562: Guido Tabellini and Scott Freeman
A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economies pp. 563-584: Leonidas C. Koutsougeras
The least core, kernel and bargaining sets of large games pp. 585-601: Dov Monderer, Ezra Einy and Diego Moreno
Coalitional stability under perfect foresight pp. 603-627: Licun Xue
Translation homotheticity pp. 629-641: Robert Chambers and Rolf Färe
Bayesian learning and convergence to Nash equilibria without common priors pp. 643-655: Yaw Nyarko
Social learning in a changing world pp. 657-665: Marco Ottaviani, Giuseppe Moscarini and Lones Smith
Rubinstein bargaining with two-sided outside options pp. 667-672: József Sákovics and Clara Ponsati

Capital market imperfections in a monetary growth model pp. 241-273: Bruce D. Smith and John H. Boyd
Unstable and stable steady-states in the Kiyotaki-Wright model pp. 275-294: Juan-Manuel Renero
Options and sunspots in a simple monetary economy pp. 295-315: Gaetano Antinolfi and Todd Keister
Manifolds of golden rule and balanced steady state equilibria pp. 317-330: Yves Balasko and C Lang
Edgeworth's conjecture with infinitely many commodities: commodity differentiation pp. 331-377: William Zame and Robert M. Anderson
Non-neutral responses to money supply shocks when consumption and leisure are Pareto substitutes pp. 379-402: Kenneth J. Matheny
The last word on Giffen goods? pp. 403-412: John Nachbar
A revealed-preference implication of weighted utility decisions under uncertainty pp. 413-426: In-Uck Park
Cooperative games in permutational structure pp. 427-442: Gerard van der Laan, Zaifu Yang and Adolphus Talman
Aggregation, efficiency and mutual fund separation in incomplete markets pp. 443-455: Jerome Detemple and Piero Gottardi
On capital accumulation paths in a neoclassical stochastic growth model pp. 457-464: Kaushik Mitra

Convergence of the Aumann-Davis-Maschler and Geanakoplos bargaining sets pp. 1-37: Robert M. Anderson
Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining pp. 39-55: Antonio Merlo and Charles Wilson
Strategic bargaining in the variable threat game pp. 57-77: Harold Houba and Wilko Bolt
Markov-perfect Nash equilibria in a class of resource games pp. 79-100: Gerhard Sorger
Semi-core equivalence pp. 101-127: Pieter Ruys, Robert P. Gilles and Hans H. Haller
Ranking agencies under moral hazard pp. 129-155: Bharat Sarath and Edward Henry Robbins
Monopolistic price setting and supply rigidities in a disequilibrium framework pp. 157-169: Werner Smolny
Credit market imperfections, income distribution, and capital accumulation pp. 171-200: Joydeep Bhattacharya
Contest success functions: an extension pp. 201-204: Christian Riis and Derek J. Clark
Incomplete markets, continuum of states and default pp. 205-213: Aloisio Araujo, Mario Pascoa and Paulo Monteiro
Matching and bargaining models of markets: approximating small markets by large markets pp. 215-224: John Wooders